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Abstract
Cities are entities that are not “simple” but “complexly orga-
nized”. Theories about geographical structure of cities, land
use patterns and cities evolution that explain how cities be-
come spatially ordered are expanding to take in considera-
tion this complexity. The conceptual foundation for the exis-
tence of central place hierarchies (i.e. the study of agglomer-
ation economies in cities and trasportation and logistic costs)
is now completed by the definition of emergent patterns that
are not directly linked to the element of their economic pro-
cesses but included in their “physic mechanisms” (i.e. the
study of complex systems). This dissertation explores some
of these aspects by performing empirical applications in the
fields of regional and complex urban economics.
The dissertation contributes to the long standing debate on
the city size distribution. From the empirical standpoint, tra-
ditional studies on the distribution of cities typically rely a
regularity known as Zipf’s Law. We first investigate some
typical shortcomings related to the choiche of the right trun-
cation point to discriminate between upper tail and body of
the distribution (chapter 2). Secondly, we invesigate specific
conditions leading to a weak form of Gibrat’s law in con-
nection with the different typologies of rank-size distribu-
tion (Zipf’s law), by adopting parametric and non-parametric
approaches (chapter 3) and, finally, we use both the laws in
studying agglomeration forces whithin the European Union
(chapter 4).
xv
Chapter 2 (co-authored with Giorgio Fazio)
In the literature, the distribution of the size of cities is a con-
troversial issue with two common candidates: the Pareto and
the Log-normal. While the first is most accredited when the
distribution is truncated above a certain threshold, the latter
is usually considered a better representation when all cities
are considered. In this chapter, we reassess the empirical ev-
idence on the city size distribution with respect to the sensi-
tivity of the rank-size rule and a non-parametric alternative
test to the choice of truncation point. In particular, we look
at US Census data for Census Designated Places and apply
a recursive-truncation approach where each possible trunca-
tion point of the distribution of all cities is considered. Our
results highlight the sensitivity of tests to the truncation point
and the difficulty of distinguishing a Pareto tail from the tail
of a log-normal.
Chapter 3 (co-authored with Aura Reggiani and Peter Ni-
jkamp)
The regional economics and geography literature has in re-
cent years shown interesting conceptual and methodological
contributions on the validity of Gibrat’s Law and Zipf’s Law.
Despite distinct modeling features, they express similar fun-
damental characteristics in an equilibrium situation. Zipf’s
law is formalized in a static form, while its associated dy-
namic process is articulated by Gibrat’s Law. Thus, it seems
that both Zipf’s Law and Gibrat’s Law can be conceived of as
heterozygote twins. Unfortunately, empirical investigations
on the close relationship “Gibrat’s Law vs. Zipf’s Law” are
rather rare. Chapter 3 aims now to answer the following re-
search question: can (a generalization of) Gibrat’s Law allow
us to infer Zipf’s Law, and vice versa? In our conceptual and
applied framework, particular attention will be paid to the
xvi
role of the mean and the variance of city population as key
indicators for assessing the (non-)validity of the generalized
Gibrat’s Law. Our empirical experiments are based on a com-
parative analysis between the dynamics of the urban pop-
ulation of five countries with entirely mutually contrasting
spatial-economic characteristics: Botswana, Germany, Hun-
gary, Luxembourg and Malta. We arrive at the following re-
sults: If (i) the mean is independent of city size (first neces-
sary condition of Gibrat’s law); and (ii) the coefficient of the
rank-size rule/Zipf’s Law is different from one, the variance
is dependent on city size. This finding suggests an important
research implication: in modeling urban growth, Gibrat’s law
holds only with respect to the condition on the mean, but
not on the variance, thus allowing for heterogeneity in the
growth of small and big cities. Furthermore, differences in
population growth lead to differences in the hierarchy of a
city system (with a rank-size coefficient different from one);
this phenomenon creates a possibility of asymmetric shocks
affecting the distribution of big vs. small cities.
Chapter 4
The creation of the European Union, the distortions caused by
the introduction of a single currency in countries structurally
so different and the expansion of mobility of people, capital
and services due to the constitution of the so-called Schen-
gen Area from the beginning of ’90s might have had some
impacts on the dynamics of city populations.
This chapter provides a study of the hierarchical structure of
the cities within the EU Member States with particular at-
tention on agglomeration forces by means of two very well-
known empirical regularities: Zipf’s law, as a proxy for ag-
glomeration forces, and Gibrat’s law as a test for stationar-
ity. We find that the hierarchical structures of Member States
xvii
is more even than expected. Moreover, the European Union
seems to be split in three distinct areas: an integrated area
characterized by the validity of Gibrat’s law (temporary shocks
might have permanent impacts on the city structure); an area
characterized by the presence of mean reversion (any exogen-
ous shock is used up in certain amount of time); a small area
where the effects of the shocks is magnified in the big cities.
Finally, we find that only the constitution of the Schengen
Area and the share of international trade seem to have a weak
impact on the hierarchical structures of Member States.
xviii
Chapter 1
Introduction
Cities are entities that are not “simple” but “complexly organized”. The-
ories about geographical structure of cities, land use patterns and cities
evolution that explain how cities become spatially ordered are expand-
ing to take in consideration this complexity. The conceptual foundation
for the existence of central place hierarchies (i.e. the study of agglom-
eration economies in cities and transportation and logistic costs) is now
completed by the definition of emergent patterns that are not directly
linked to the element of their economic processes but included in their
“physic mechanisms” (i.e. the study of complex systems). This disserta-
tion explores some of these aspects by performing empirical applications
in the fields of regional and complex urban economics.
Content of the dissertation
Chapter 21 investigates the city size distribution with respect to the “trun-
cation point”. In particular, we propose a recursive-truncation approach
to reassess the common Zipf’s Law regression and a non-parametric al-
ternative proposed by Clauset, Shalizi and Newman et al. (2009) against
1Chapter 2 is the reproduction of the paper already under reviewing “Pareto or log-
normal? A recursive truncation approach to the distribution of (all) cities”, co-authored
with Giorgio Fazio of University of Palermo and University of Glasgow.
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all possible truncation points of the entire distribution of cities.
The main challenge of chapter 32 is, instead, to empirically explore
specific conditions leading to a weak form of Gibrat’s law in connec-
tion with the different typologies of rank-size distribution (Zipf’s law),
by adopting parametric and non-parametric approaches. In this sense
we recognize features of heterozygotic twins, between Zipf’s law and
Gibrat’s law.
Finally, chapter 4, starting from the consideration that the European
Union is still a multifaceted entity, at least in terms of urban structure, in-
vestigates whether the deeper and deeper integration of European Union
affected the hierarchical structure of the city system of the Member States
and, furthermore, if the European Union is an area where urban and re-
gional policies affect Member States in the same way or, on the contrary,
if it is still a heterogeneous entity and a heterogeneous area in recovering
from exogenous shocks.
Research questions
To summarize, the current dissertation aims at dealing with the follow-
ing research questions:
1. What is the role played by the choice of the truncation point in
discriminating between a Pareto distribution and a log-normal dis-
tribution in the context of city size distribution? (Chapter 2)
2. Is it possible to determine the switching point between the two dis-
tributions with the use of an “endogenous method”? (Chapter 2)
3. What are the relationships between Zipf’s law and Gibrat’s law on
the light of the so-call “generalized Gibrat’s law”? Cordoba (2003)
(Chapter 3)
2Chapter 3 is the reproduction of the paper already under reviewing “Are Gibrat and
Zipf Monozygotic or Heterozygotic Twins? A Comparative Analysis of Means and Vari-
ances in Complex Urban Systems”, co-authored with Aura Reggiani of University of
Bologna and Peter Nijkamp of VU University of Amsterdam.
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4. Is it possible to recognize a weak form of Gibrat’s law allowing the
possibility of asymmetric shocks affecting the distribution of big
vs. small cities? (Chapter 3)
5. Does the EU affects the city system hierarchy and agglomeration
forces of the Member States? (Chapter 4)
6. Can EU city system be seen as an integrated area, which is an area
where urban and regional policies affect Member States in the same
way? (Chapter 4)
7. Which are the drivers of agglomeration forces within the EU Mem-
ber States? (Chapter 4)
Main results
The empirical evidence related to the previous set of research questions
of each chapter is summarized as follows.
Chapter 2
First, we estimate the Pareto exponent from the typical rank-size equa-
tion for each possible recursive truncation of data. Collecting the recur-
sive estimates, and respective confidence intervals, we find evidence of
Zipf’s Law with the Pareto exponent equal to one in the very upper tail
(above the largest 135 cities). However, we find that the parameter varies
(decreases) with respect to the truncation point, a result that is inter-
preted by Eeckhout (2004) as evidence of a log-normal distribution. In
any case, the recursive nature of our regressions, when we start lower-
ing the truncation point, adding smaller cities one at the time, we find
that the size of Pareto coefficient first becomes statistically different from
one and then starts decreasing, showing a non-monotonic behavior with
respect to the truncation point, highlighting a potential non-linearity of
Zipf’s law with respect to the truncation point. Indeed, the Pareto seems
to apply for more than one range of the distribution: when this is trun-
cated to the very upper tail and for an intermediate range of cities.
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Second, we apply the method recently suggested by Clauset et al.
(2009) to estimate the lower bound of a Pareto distribution and, using
a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, we compare the relative fitness of the data
to the Pareto and the log-normal distribution. Using this approach, we
find that the Pareto distribution seems to apply for a much longer upper
tail than the one traditionally considered in the literature. However, this
analysis shows that when the truncation point is extended to include
smaller ans smaller cities, it is not possible to disentangle the two on the
grounds of statistical significance, but on the grounds of the size of the
statistics. In general, the Pareto seems a better fit when we are close to
the upper portion of the data and the log-normal seems a better fit when
we approach the entire distribution, however the both distribution can
apply to the upper portion of the distribution of cities (above around the
first 100 cities). Beyond these cities, the upper tail conforms better to the
Pareto distribution on the grounds of statistical significance.
Third, we reassess the above methods using simulated data of alter-
native distributions: a Pareto, a log-normal and a mixture of the two,
where the upper tail is Pareto and the main body is log-normal. Our re-
sults add to the debate on the distribution of city size, highlighting some
novel results in terms of the sensitivity of tests to the truncation point and
showing some potential pitfalls in their ability to distinguish between the
two distributions. In particular, while the rank size regressions seem to
point to the distribution of cities as potentially a false power law with the
log-normal simulated data displaying a remarkably similar signature to
the real data, the non parametric test seems less conclusive. In this case,
the size of the test statistics for the simulated log-normal and the real data
are also remarkably similar in the very upper tail. Only when the tail is
extended, the test seems to point again in favor of the Pareto. Hence, the
non-parametric test seems unable to settle whether the distribution of
cities is a weak or a false power law. Moving from the entire distribution
towards the upper tail, the log-normal seems to give space to the Pareto.
However, moving even further towards the very upper tail, tests seems
unable to statistically distringuish among the two.
These results seem to support to the claim by Eeckhout (2009) that an
4
arbitrary choice of the cut-off of the distribution may mislead scholars to
conclude in favor of one or the other distribution.
Chapter 3
We show in this chapter that, according to Cordoba (2003), the variance
of city growth can be dependent on size if the rank-size coefficient is dif-
ferent from one; in particular, we verified what Cordoba (2003) calls a
“generalized Gibrat’s law” for different countries with different spatial-
economic characteristics: Botswana, Germany, Hungary, Luxembourg
and Malta. We found strong evidence of this generalized Gibrat’s law for
Botswana, Luxembourg and Malta. We found weak evidence of Gibrat’s
law for Germany and no evidence for Hungary.
Our results confirm the propositions provided by Cordoba (2003). In
particular, when the rank-size coefficient is equal to 1, neither the mean
nor the variance of growth depend on size; when the rank-size coefficient
is greater than 1, the mean is independent of the city size, but not the
variance, and small cities face a greater volatility in growth than larger
cities; alternatively, when the rank-size coefficient is lower than 1, the
mean is independent from the city size, but not the variance, and large
cities face a greater volatility in growth than smaller ones.
These results seem to support that Gibrat and Zipf have offered com-
plementary perspectives on city size and systems of cites in a given coun-
try. Their contributions are not necessarily identical, but offer new per-
spectives on the same multi-faceted prism of the space-economy. These
laws are part of the same family, but also reveal specific distinct fea-
tures. In particular, we find that Zipf’s law and the rank-size rule behave
like“monozygotic” twins, while Gibrat’s law seems to show the behavi-
ous of a “heterozygotic” twins.
Chapter 4
We show here that the hierarchical structures of Member States of the
European Union is more even than expected. Moreover, EU city system
is still far from being an integrated area and in particular, we find that the
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European Union seems to be split in three distinct areas: an integrated
area characterized by the validity of Gibrat’s law where large temporary
shocks might have permanent impacts on the city structure; another area
that is characterized by the presence of mean reversion and where any
exogenous shock is used up in certain amount of time and a small area
where the effects of the shocks is magnified in the big cities. Finally,
we find that only the constitution of the Schengen Area and the share
of international trade seem to have a weak impact on the hierarchical
structures of Member States presenting respectively a positive impact on
the Zipf coefficient (more even distribution) and a negative impact (more
agglomerated distribution) and then indicating two sources, one against
and one in favor, of agglomeration forces.
Contribution to the literature
In this section of the introductory chapter aims at stressing the most im-
portant innovative contributions to the economic literature of the current
dissertation.
Chapter 2
The economic empirical literature on the city size distribution focused
on the upper tail without any formal consideration of what is the right
truncation point. Moreover, the truncation point is generally arbitrarly
choosen. Chapter 2 is, to my knowledge, the first attempt to fill this
gap. Moreover, the analysis exposes the sensitivity of existing tests to
the choice of a specific truncation and highlights the difficulty of distin-
guishing between the tail of a log-normal and a power law tail for the
population distribution of cities.
Chapter 3
The innovative contributions of chapter 3 are twofold. First of all, our
results suggest a new research implication: in modeling urban growth,
scholars can allow a certain degree of heterogeneity in the growth of
6
small and big cities. Indeed, we show that, if Zipf’s law is different from
1 than Gibrat’s law holds only with respect the condition on the mean,
but not on the variance. Consequently, this study shows that, the (gen-
eralization) of Gibrat’s law allows the possibility of asymmetric shocks
affecting the distribution of big vs. small cities. Secondly, these results
might be useful to “relax” Gibrat’s law in its strict interpretation, by re-
inforcing the hypothesis that small entities face a greater volatility in the
growth process.
Chapter 4
The innovative contribution to the economic literature of chapter 4 re-
gards several aspects. To my knowledge, chapter 4 is the first attempt to
homogenize the data in performing an international analysis on city size
distribution with the use of an endogenous methodology. In this way
we can reduce substantially measurement errors arising from arbitrary
methodologies typically used. At the same time we use two very well
known empirical regularities, Zipf’s law and Gibrat’s law in an alterna-
tive way, where alternative means that aim of the chapter is not to verify
if the former laws hold but it means that we use them as a tools to ex-
plore other research questions. Finally we analyze agglomeration forces
within the European Union.
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Chapter 2
Pareto or log-normal? A
recursive truncation
approach to the distribution
of (all) cities
2.1 Introduction1
An accurate description of the spatial distribution of population is im-
portant for a number of theoretical and policy relevant issues, ranging
from a better understanding of firms and people localization decisions
to the implementation of national and regional policies in terms of in-
centives and transport infrastructures. Unfortunately, the literature is
still far from reaching consensus on such description. Two specific dis-
tributions are most accredited: the Pareto and the log-normal. Disentan-
gling between the two has important theoretical implications. For ex-
ample, a Pareto distribution implies that cities are the result of agglom-
eration forces and industry specific productivity shocks. A log-normal
1The current chapter is a repruduction of the paper already under reviewing “Pareto or
log-normal? A recursive truncation approach to the distribution of (all) cities”, co-authored
with Giorgio Fazio of University of Palermo and University of Glasgow.
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distribution, instead, implies that cities grow proportionally and inde-
pendently from the initial city size and their distribution results from
city-wide rather than industry specific shocks (see Gabaix, 1999, for a
discussion).
From the empirical standpoint, traditional studies on the distribution
of cities typically rely on the relationship between the log-rank and log-
size of cities, a regularity known as Zipf’s Law. Several economic in-
terpretations of the estimated Pareto coefficient have been given. For
instance, Singer (1930) interprets this coefficient as a measure inequality
in the city distribution and, hence, an indicator of the degree of urban-
ization and population concentration. If the estimated coefficient tends
to zero, the entire population of the country tends to be located in one
city. On the other end, if the parameter tends to infinity, all cities tend
to have the same size (see, also, Soo, 2005). Hence, Singer (1930) con-
siders this coefficient as an index of metropolization, so that the lower
the estimated parameter the higher the value of urban land. Parr (1985)
proposes a link between the overall level of development and the de-
gree of metropolization, so that more developed countries should show
a higher degree of metropolization (and a more unequally distributed
city system) because of the improvement of transportation system be-
tween cities and regions in those countries. Along this vein, Brackman
et al. (2001) interpret the estimated Pareto coefficient as an indicator of
industrialization and agglomeration economies. Finally, Reggiani and
Nijkamp (2012) interpret the estimated coefficient as an indicator of eco-
nomic development regarding the urban structure as a socio-economic
connected network. Along these lines, they compare this coefficient to
the degree of connectivity in a network.
Using the rank-size regression approach, traditional studies favor a
Pareto distribution with shape parameter equal to one, i.e. a minus one
relationship between the log-rank and the log-size of cities, a regularity
known as Zipf’s Law. For example, Rosen and Resnick (1980) estimate
the value of the Pareto exponent in a sample of 44 countries, finding a
mean exponent of 1.136 with most countries falling in the [0.8-1.5] range.
They also suggest that larger cities grow faster than smaller cities in most
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of their sample countries. Soo (2005) updates these results, finding a
mean Pareto exponent of 1.105 over a sample of 75 countries, but also
concludes for a rejection of Zipf’s Law in more than half of cases. Other
papers search for historical evidence of Zipf’s Law. Guerin-Pace (1995)
studies Zipf’s Law in France between 1831 and 1990 and shows that the
estimated Pareto coefficient may be sensitive to sample selection criteria.
Black and Henderson (2003) construct a data set of US metropolitan areas
defined over the period 1900-1990 choosing a minimum relative popu-
lation threshold in each decade. They find a yearly Pareto coefficient
around 0.85. Estimated coefficients are again sensitive to the choice of
sample size. Glaeser, Ponzetto and Tobio (2011) study almost 200 years
of regional changes in the US and show that the Zipf’s Law tends to
change over time.
However, these studies usually consider only the upper tail of the
data, i.e. the largest cities, with a sample truncation point that is usu-
ally arbitrarily chosen. Moreover, the evidence in favor of a Pareto has
to be reconciled with other empirical evidence that cities grow propor-
tionally, a phenomenon known as Gibrat’s Law, which should instead
lead to a log-normal city-size distribution.2 Differently from the above
studies, Eeckhout (2004) suggests that the distribution of all cities, rather
than just the upper tail, should be considered. He proposes an empiri-
cal investigation based on the US Census Designated Places (CDPs) and
argues that city growth does not depend on the initial city size, provid-
ing evidence in favor of Gibrat’s Law. Moreover, he shows that the es-
timated OLS coefficient of the so-called rank-size rule varies depending
on the truncation city size, i.e. the inclusion of smaller (larger) cities in
the sample should lead to a smaller (larger) coefficient, a result consis-
tent with an underlying log-normal distribution. Based on these results,
Eeckhout concludes that the size distribution of all cities follows a log-
normal, rather than a Pareto.
These results have sparked some controversy about the distribution
of cities beyond the upper tail. Using the same data of Eeckhout (2004),
2Gabaix (1999) shows that Zipf’s Law may result as the steady state distribution from
Gibrat’s Law.
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Levy (2009) presents a log-log plot of rank and city size and argues that
the distribution of city size can be divided into two parts: a power law
fits well the upper part, a log-normal fits better the bottom and middle
parts. Eeckhout (2009) highlights the caveats of log-log plots. Instead,
he proposes looking at the confidence bands of the log-normal estimates
generated by a Lilliefors test and argues that the upper tail is also log-
normal.3
However, Eeckhout (2009) underlines the difficulty of discriminating
between a Pareto upper tail and the tail of a log-normal and hints at what
may turn out to be a critical, and yet overlooked, point in the literature:
“With all the data available, and given that one nonetheless does not want to use
all data, the question arises what the appropriate truncation point is. The choice
of the truncation point becomes endogenous and can be chosen subjectively to
favor one hypothesis over another”. Eeckhout (2009, p. 1682). Hence, it
seems that a particular distribution may be favored in empirical studies
depending on the chosen truncation point.
The truncation point issue is directly related to the problem of dis-
criminating between different inverse power laws, which can be classi-
fied according to Perline (2005) into strong, weak and false, depending
on the strength of the Pareto law. A strong Pareto law arises when “an in-
verse power law fits the full, untruncated range of the distribution of interest”;
a weak one when “only some upper portion of the distribution follows an ap-
proximate inverse power law” and a false when “the largest observations (ex-
tremes) of the samples drawn from certain exponential type, and especially log-
normal distributions, can closely mimic an inverse power law” Perline (2005,
pp. 75-76). Hence, the point where the sample is truncated may indeed
turn out to be critical in discriminating between alternative distributions.
Both traditional and recent studies do not thoroughly address this issue.
3 In an interesting recent paper, Giesen et al. (2010) look at data for all cities in 8 coun-
tries and, using non-parametric and parametric goodness of fitness tests, conclude that the
distribution of all cities is a Double Pareto Log-Normal (DPLN), i.e. a distribution that is
Pareto in the upper and lower tails and log-normal in between. However, the DPLN dis-
tribution uses a larger set of parameters compared to the Pareto or the log-normal, which
are definitely more parsimonious with only two parameters. Hence, the fitness improve-
ments of alternative distributions, such as the DPLN, should be evaluated in relation to
their dependence on a larger set of parameters.
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In the light of the above, and in particular of the evidence that the es-
timated rank-size regression coefficient varies depending on the trunca-
tion city size, the typical economic interpretations of the estimated Pareto
coefficient have to be considered together with a deeper analysis of the
truncation point issue.
In this chapter, we propose a reappraisal of the debate on the city size
distribution in relation to the specific issue of the truncation point. To the
best of our knowledge, the only other papers attempting to investigate
this issue are Bee et al. (2011) and Ioannides and Skouras (2013).
Bee et al. (2011) compare the two distributions by means of the max-
imum entropy density. This allows them to identify a very long power
law spans, between 1205 and 1515 observations. Ioannides and Skouras
(2013) try, instead, to determine the switching point between the Pareto
distribution and the log-normal using maximum likelihood estimation
over a “mixed” distribution, i.e. a distribution with a log-normal “body”
and a Pareto “tail”. This allows them to identify the threshold for a
Pareto distribution around the city with population 60,290, concluding
that even if the entire distribution may well be log-normal, most of the
population resides in Pareto distribution.
Here, in order to investigate this issue, we propose two alternative
approaches based on recursive analysis. Similarly to Eeckhout (2004),
we do not constrain the investigation to the upper tail, but look at all
cities. However, we look at all possible truncation points of the empirical
distribution of all cities in order to discriminate between the two most
accredited alternative theoretical distributions: the Pareto and the log-
normal.
Using this approach, we are also able to provide a more extensive in-
vestigation into the city size distribution. First, we estimate the Pareto
exponent from the typical rank-size equation for each possible recursive
truncation of data. Collecting the recursive estimates, and respective
confidence intervals, we can statistically assess the adherence of Zipf’s
Law for each truncated sample of the distribution of all US cities. We
find that the parameter varies (decreases) with respect to the truncation
point, a result that is interpreted by Eeckhout (2004) as evidence of a log-
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normal distribution. Thanks to the recursive nature of our regressions,
however, we are also able to highlight a potential non-linearity of Zipf’s
law with respect to the truncation point. Indeed, the Pareto seems to ap-
ply for more than one range of the distribution: when this is truncated to
the very upper tail and for an intermediate range of cities.
Second, we apply the method recently suggested by Clauset, Shal-
izi and Newman (2009) to estimate the lower bound of a Pareto distri-
bution and, using a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, we compare the relative
fitness of the data to the Pareto and the log-normal distribution. Using
this approach, we find that the Pareto distribution seems to apply for a
much longer upper tail than the one traditionally considered in the liter-
ature. In particular, we identify a population threshold of around 57,775,
a number very close to that found by Ioannides and Skouras (2013).
Third, we reassess the above methods using simulated data of alter-
native distributions: a Pareto, a log-normal and a mixture of the two,
where the upper tail is Pareto and the main body is log-normal. Our
results add to the debate on the distribution of city size, highlighting
some novel results in terms of the sensitivity of tests to the truncation
point and showing some potential pitfalls in their ability to distinguish
between the two distributions. In particular, moving from the entire dis-
tribution towards the upper tail, the log-normal seems to give space to
the Pareto. However, moving even further towards the very upper tail,
tests seems unable to statistically distinguish among the two. These sim-
ulations seem to confirm the difficulty to identify the city size distribu-
tion as either a weak or a false inverse power law.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. The next section
presents the empirical strategy and the results of recursive Zipf’s Law
equations and Kologorov-Smirnov tests. Section 2.3 replicates the method-
ology using simulated data. Section 2.4 concludes.
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Figure 1: Log-log rank size plots (first 1000 largest cities vs entire distribu-
tion)
2.2 A recursive approach to the ditribution of
all cities
A long tradition of papers underlines the difficulty of discriminating be-
tween a Pareto tail and log-normal distribution. For example, in refer-
ence to the use of log-log plots, which provide a visual assessment of
the rank-size rule, Macauley (1922) states that the linearity of the tail of
a frequency distribution charted on a logarithmic scale is not informa-
tive of a Pareto distribution, as it is a common feature of various types of
frequency distributions. Parr and Suzuki (1973, p. 343) similarly affirm
that: “[...]truncation of the log-normal distribution at an appropriately high
level enables the truncated portion to be regarded as not significantly different
from the rank size distribution”. This point is illustrated in Figure 1 that
compares log-log plots for the upper tail and for the entire distribution.
While the left quadrant clearly points to a Pareto, the right seems to point
to a log-normal.
More formally, Eeckhout (2004) shows that a variableP obeys a Pareto
distribution if its density function, φ(P ), and cumulative density func-
tion, Φ(P ), are:
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φ(P ) =
aP a
P a+1
∀P ≥ P , (2.1)
Φ(P ) = 1−
(
P
P
)a
∀P ≥ P , (2.2)
where q is a positive shape parameter and P is the scale parameter
or the truncation city size, i.e. the minimum value of population P . The
parameter q is also known as the Pareto coefficient and is a tail index. As
mentioned above, in a log-log plot the distribution is represented by a
straight line and Zipf’s law satisfies Pareto with q = 1.
According to Clauset, Shalizi and Newman (2009), few phenomena
seem to obey the Pareto distribution for all values and, as discussed
above, most studies on the city size distribution find that the Pareto dis-
tribution is a good representation just for the upper tail, i.e. above a
minimum threshold. However, even when a researcher intends to inves-
tigate just the upper tail, the choice of P may be critical, as a truncation
point that is too high (low) may shorten (lengthen) the “right” size of
the upper tail biasing tests of the appropriate distribution. The identifi-
cation of the right truncation point may be interesting also for another
issue. If, as sustained in some literature, the upper tail is Pareto and
the entire distribution is log-normal, is there a switching point between
the two distributions? This issue has received some attention in physics
and statistics (see, among the others, Mitzenmacher, 2004; Perline, 2005;
Clauset, Shalizi and Newman, 2009), but, with the exception of Eeckhout
(2004) and very recently by Ioannides and Skouras (2013), it has been
largely ignored in economics, where the choice of threshold is usually
arbitrary.
In order to investigate the sensitivity of the distribution to the trunca-
tion point, we apply a recursive approach to the distribution of all cities.
Following Eeckhout (2004), to consider “all” cities we use US Census
data covering almost all the US population in “incorporated” and “unin-
corporated” places in the year 2000 and, for comparison, the year 2010.
An incorporated place is an entity (populated area) with its own munici-
pal government (city, town, village, borough and so on). Unincorporated
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places are, instead, areas lacking of own municipal government. In the
US Census, these take the name of Census Designated Places (CDPs).
The CDPs have been included for the first time in the year 2000. For the
year 2000, the dataset covers 25,359 places and 208 millions US residents
of the total 281 millions and, for the year 2010, 29,494 places and 230 mil-
lions US residents of the 308 millions total. The difference in number of
places is due to changes introduced by the US Census Bureau: 24,841 are
identical in the two years. Even though they may not coincide with the
economically more meaningful definition of city, and previous work has
considered Metropolitan Areas as the reference unit (see Gabaix, 1999;
Ioannides and Overman, 2003), we prefer “places” as reference units in
order to make our result comparable with Eeckhout (2004) and account
for a larger population size. Here, for robustness we replicate the anal-
ysis for the two years. However we have to keep in mind that “for size
distribution studies, the entire metropolitan area is the most desirable choice for
an urban unit as it represents an integrated economic unit. Since many workers
and consumers in a city often reside in the surrounding suburbs, it seems rea-
sonable to include these areas in the definition of the city” Rosen and Resnick
(1980, p. 170).
2.2.1 Recursive Zipf’s Law
As mentioned above, we use a recursive approach to observe the adher-
ence of the data to Zipf’s Law for all possible truncation points of the
distribution of all cities. As standard in the literature, we estimate the
Pareto coefficient using simple rank-size OLS regressions where, follow-
ing Gabaix and Ibragimov (2011), the rank is shifted by 0.5 to correct for
the potential bias in small samples highlighted by Gabaix and Ioannides
(2004), so that the estimating equation is:
ln(rank − 0.5) = k − q lnP, (2.3)
where k is a constant and P is the population size. Standard errors
are given by (2/n)0.5 qˆ. The parameter qˆ is estimated for recursively trun-
cated samples of the city size distribution, starting with the ten most pop-
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Table 1: Estimated coefficients for chosen truncation thresholds. Dependent
variable ln (Rank-0.5)
2000 Census Data 2010 Census Data
N P kˆ(s.e.) qˆ(s.e.) [GI s.e.] R2 P kˆ(s.e.) qˆ(s.e.) [GI s.e.] R2
135 155,554 21.955 1.423 0.992 178,395 22.532 1.460 0.993
(0.137) (0.011) [0.173] (0.139) (0.011) [0.178]
2,000 19,383 20.747 1.322 0.997 21,039 20.870 1.322 0.995
(0.045) (0.004) [0.042] (0.057) (0.005) [0.042]
5,000 6,592 18.623 1.129 0.984 7,273 18.721 1.137 0.983
(0.052) (0.005) [0.023] (0.057) (0.006) [0.023]
12,500 1,378 15.954 0.864 0.960 1,556 16.064 0.866 0.961
(0.036) (0.004) [0.011] (0.037) (0.004) [0.011]
25,000 42 13.187 0.553 0.875 193 13.899 0.630 0.922
(0.021) (0.003) [0.005] (0.021) (0.003) [0.006]
29,000 35 13.136 0.538 0.882
(0.018) (0.003) [0.005]
ulated cities and then adding one (less populated) city at the time until,
like Eeckhout (2004), we consider all cities. Collecting the estimates of the
Pareto exponent together with the respective 95% confidence interval,
we can statistically assess the validity of Zipf’s Law for each truncated
city size distribution. In particular, while the estimated Pareto coefficient
should be invariant to the truncation point, it should increase under the
log-normal (Eeckhout, 2004).
Table 1 extracts the recursive OLS estimates of equation (2.3) for the
six truncation points reported in Eeckhout (2004). These results seem
consistent with previous work. The estimated Pareto coefficients seem,
indeed, “threshold sensitive”: the “longer” the upper tail, the lower the
estimated coefficient. As already indicated in Eeckhout (2004), the coef-
ficients decrease together with the truncation point. It is also interesting
to compare the estimated parameters for the two different census years.
The 2010 Census contains a larger number of observations mostly thanks
to the improved accuracy in the definition of unincorporated places, as
many CDPs present in the Census 2000 dataset have been split into two
or more CDPs especially in the middle and in the lower tail of the distri-
bution. The presence of these new observations does not seem to affect
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Figure 2: Recursive Pareto coefficient and 95% Confidence Interval (Gabaix-
Ibragimov s.e.)
(a) Upper tail (1000 largest cities)
(b) All cities
our results.
In Figures 2a and 2b we present the full recursive estimates. Figure 2a
focuses on the largest 1,000 cities to look more closely at the upper tail.4
Over this range, the estimated Pareto coefficient looks quasi-constant,
indicating a potential Pareto distribution.
The coefficient shows some degree of fluctuation in the very first ob-
4We anticipate in this note that we focus on the first 1,000 cities because when lowering
the threshold after that point, the estimated Pareto coefficient is decreasing. Moreover
we will show in Figure 2b that around that threshold we have a change in the “slope” of
the estimated coefficient, indicating, in our opinion, the switch between the log-normal
distribution to the Pareto distribution.
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servations, probably due to the influence of individual observations in
a smaller sample, and then increases. In terms of statistical significance,
estimates are indifferent from one for the first observations and are then
statistically different from one, settling around the average estimated pa-
rameter of 1.4. Hence, Zipf’s Law seems to be rejected, if not for the very
first observations.
Interestingly, this information was not evident by looking at Table
1, where it was only possible to see the rank-size rule as a diminishing
threshold process, but it was not possible to fully gauge the adherence of
the data to Zipf’s law for the upper tail.
What happens if we extend the analysis from the upper tail (here, the
first 1000 cities) to all cities in the sample? Figure 2b shows all the esti-
mated Pareto coefficients (and 95% confidence intervals) against each re-
cursive truncation threshold. A number of results are worth mentioning.
First, the coefficient clearly diminishes (increases) as we include smaller
cities (larger cities), a result that, contrary to Figure 2a, corroborates the
evidence of log-normality. Second, in terms of statistical significance,
the recursive coefficients seem to display non-monotonic behavior. The
Pareto coefficient is not statistically different from one in the very upper
tail, where researchers typically set their cut-off point to estimate Zipf’s
Law (see Black and Henderson, 2003; Soo, 2005), but also for a second
range of cities (between the 7,116th and 8,773rd in the year 2000 and
7,066th and 8,763rd in the year 2010). Hence, the Pareto exponent is not
statistically different from 1 for two samples of the same distribution.
Clearly, this result could only emerge by looking at all possible trunca-
tion points.
Figures 2a and 2b confirm how picking an arbitrary P may (mis)lead
researchers to conclude in favor of a specific distribution. Finally, com-
parison of the left and right panels shows that results are robust to the use
of different census years and are stable over time, with similar patterns
and hierarchy. This also suggests that a more precise specification of the
medium-small cities in 2010 does not significantly affect the results.
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2.2.2 A Non-parametric Test Alternative
In this section, we exploit an alternative non-parametric methodology in
order to discriminate between a Pareto distribution and a log-normal dis-
tribution. As discussed above, few phenomena seem to obey the Pareto
distribution for all values and most studies find that the Pareto distribu-
tion is a good representation just for the upper tail, i.e. above a mini-
mum threshold. Here we use the method proposed by Clauset, Shalizi
and Newman (2009) to estimate this minimum threshold, Pˆ . The authors
suggest testing the equality between the theoretical and empirical den-
sity functions using Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests over recursively trun-
cated distributions. In this context we test the hypothesis that our distri-
bution is a Pareto distribution. This means that we first run a Kolmogorov-
Smirnov goodness of fit test for a Pareto distribution in the same recur-
sive way we have done in the previous section for the estimation of the
Pareto coefficient. Namely we get around 25,000 thousands KS tests in
2000 and around 29,000 KS tests in 2010. Then we choose as threshold,
indicating the switch between log-normal and Pareto distribution, the
population level of that city corresponding to the minimum KS statistics
in a given year. For example, suppose the minimum KS appears in a sub-
sample with the top 500 cities. Then, the population of the city with rank
500 will be the level of the population threshold. In sum, our estimate
Pˆ is then the value of P that minimizes the “recursive” Kolmogorov-
Smirnov statistics, D:
D = sup
p>p
|Φp(x)− Φ(x)|, (2.4)
where Φp(x) is the empirical cumulative density function for p i.i.d
observations, and Φ(x) is the theoretical cumulative density function of
the Pareto distribution. The KS statistic computes the supremum of the
absolute value of the set of distances among the two. Under the null, the
difference between the two is zero, i.e. the sample is drawn from the ref-
erence distribution. Rejection of the null, however, should be considered
carefully, as the KS test tends to over-reject the null when the sample is
large.
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Figure 3: Recursive Kolmogorov-Smirnov test
(a) Upper tail (1000 largest cities)
(b) All cities
Figure 3 reports the recursive Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistics. As be-
fore, we begin the recursive analysis with the largest cities and then add
smaller ones until we include all cities. In panel a) of Figure 3, we first
look at the largest 1000 cities. The overall evidence seems to favor the
Pareto distribution. Interestingly, however, for the very upper tail (ex-
actly, 93 cities in 2000 and 90 in 2010), the KS statistics are visually too
close and do not allow disentangling between the two distributions. For
these observations, the p-values of the KS statistics confirm that both
theoretical distributions can equally adapt to the empirical.5 After this
5The authors will provide details on the p-values upon request.
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portion of the upper tail, however, the Pareto seems to adapt better to
the data with p-values rejecting the null of the KS test for a large portion
of the upper tail. In particular, the KS test is rejected for the Pareto up
to around the 1500th truncation point in the year 2000 around the 990th
truncation point in the year 2010.
Following the approach of Clauset, Shalizi and Newman (2009), we
find the minimum of the KS statistic for the 536th city in the year 2000
(D=0.0173) and 695th city in the year 2010 (D= 0.0198), which implies a
minimum population threshold of 57,777 and 55,081 inhabitants, respec-
tively. These tests, then, highlight a Pareto upper tail well before the
arbitrary threshold of 100,000 inhabitants typically used by scholars for
US data (Soo, 2005). In panel b) of Figure 3, we show KS recursive statis-
tics for all truncated samples up to the entire untruncated distribution.
Again, the evidence in favor of one or the other distribution changes de-
pending on the truncation point: comparison of the KS statistics shows
first the Pareto and then the log-normal as a better fit. Just like for the
very upper tail, the two distributions are again indistinguishable half
way to the entire distribution. When the distribution of all cities is con-
sidered, the log-normal appears as the best fit, as indicated by Eeckhout
(2004). These results are in line with those obtained from the Zipf’s Law
regressions in the previous sub-section. If we do not take into account
the problem of the correct cut-off, the KS test, also, could lead to con-
cluding for a Pareto, when the true distribution is log-normal, and vicev-
ersa. Further, the evidence presented cannot rule out that a portion of
the distribution of cities, the upper tail in particular, may be power law
distributed and it confirms the difficulty of disentangling a Pareto and a
log-normal in a portion of the upper tail.
2.3 Weak or false inverse Power-law?
The above analysis seems to confirm the sensitivity of test results with
respect to the choice of truncation point. Moreover, it seems to highlight
the distribution of cities as potentially as either a weak or a false power
law, according to the definitions of Perline (2005). Indeed, it is not clear
22
whether “only some upper portion of the distribution follows an approximate
inverse power law” (weak power law) or “the largest observations (extremes)
of the samples drawn from certain exponential type, and especially log-normal
distributions, can closely mimic an inverse power law” (false power law), Per-
line (2005, pp. 68-69).
To further investigate this issue, we reassess the rank-size regressions
and the non-parametric alternative against simulated data. In particular,
we simulate three different random datasets: a log-normal, a Pareto with
shape parameter equal to one (so that Zipf’s law holds) and a “mixture”
of Pareto upper tail (first 1000 observations) and log-normal body. In de-
tail, we draw a log-normal dataset with same mean (7.28) and standard
deviation (1.75) of the real data in the year 2000. For the “mixture” data
we replace the first 1000 observations of the log-normal distribution with
a sample where the first observation is twice the second, thrice the third
and so on.
Following the same steps of the previous section, we first report the
estimated recursive Pareto coefficients over the range of the 1000 largest
cities and then over the entire distribution. Results are presented in panel
a) of Figure 4. Looking at the upper tail, we notice a quasi-constant be-
havior of the coefficient (with different means) for all three simulated
datasets. As expected, the estimated coefficients are not significantly
different from one for the Pareto and the mixture-distributions. Inter-
estingly, the estimated Pareto coefficients are not significantly different
from one in the very upper tail to then become different from one for
the simulated log-normal data, exhibiting a similar size and statistical
significance to the real data.
When we look at the entire distribution (panel b) of Figure 4, the
estimated Pareto coefficients are, unsurprisingly, constant over the en-
tire distribution. They are flatter for the mixture data, displaying a long
Pareto tail. Again, the simulated log-normal displays the same signature
of the real data.
In Figure 5, we repeat the recursive non-parametric approach on the
simulated data. Overall, for the largest 1000 cities in panel a), the KS
statistics seem to indicate that the Pareto distribution is better than the
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log-normal, irrespective of the type of simulated distribution.
However, in the very upper tail the KS statistics for the Pareto and
the log-normal are indistinguishable, just like for the real data. When we
add smaller and smaller cities beyond the 1000th in panel b) of Figure 5,
results show great concordance between the real data, the log-normal
and the “mixture” distribution, with the latter unsurprisingly exhibit-
ing a longer upper tail.
Both Zipf’s Law and Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests seem to highlight
the simulated log-normal as the most similar to the real data. This result
seems to suggest that for a portion of the upper tail, and especially the
distribution of the largest cities, the log-normal may be a close represen-
tation of the real data, as well as the Pareto. This evidence, however, has
to be combined with that from Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests in the previ-
ous section, where the log-normal and the Pareto could both apply to the
very first observations of the upper tail (around the largest 100 cities), but
when the tail is extended, only the Pareto distribution is statistically in-
different from the real data. Hence, we are unable to unambiguously es-
tablish whether the distribution of cities falls in the weak or false power
law category.
2.4 Conclusions
The identification of the correct city size distribution emerges from the
literature as controversy with two most likely candidates: the Pareto and
the log-normal distributions. Recently, some commentators (see Eeck-
hout, 2009, in particular) have suggested the possibility that part of this
controversy may be due to the arbitrary choice of truncation of the dis-
tribution of all cities. A truncation point that is too high, or too low, may
bias tests of the appropriate distribution of the upper tail. Also, a false
power law may emerge when the extremes of the samples closely mimic
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an inverse power law, especially if drawn from a log-normal (Perline,
2005). Yet, this issues has been substantially overlooked in the economics
literature and on the light of these facts the typical economic interpreta-
tions of the estimated Pareto coefficient lose their importance without an
in depth analysis of the truncation point.
In this chapter, we investigate the city size distribution with respect to
the “truncation point”. In particular, we propose a recursive-truncation
approach to reassess the common Zipf’s Law regression and a non-para-
metric alternative proposed by Clauset, Shalizi and Newman (2009) agai-
nst all possible truncation points of the entire distribution of cities.
Some interesting results emerge from this analysis. First, in line with
previous results, we find evidence of Zipf’s Law with the Pareto expo-
nent equal to one in the very upper tail (above the largest 135 cities).
However, when we start lowering the truncation point, adding smaller
cities one at the time, we find that the size of Pareto coefficient first be-
comes statistically different from one and then starts decreasing, show-
ing a non-monotonic behavior with respect to the truncation point. Sta-
tistically, the coefficient crosses one for different ranges of truncation
points: in the upper tail and much later when the sample is truncated
around the 8000th city. In this situation, we need to reject the classi-
cal Zipf’s law (Pareto distribution with shape parameter equal to one)
most of the time and when that estimated coefficient is equal to one,
we showed that in general it lies in a region where the estimated coef-
ficient is decreasing according to the chosen threshold. Finally, in line
with Eeckhout (2004), the log-normal seems the best fit when the entire
distribution of cities is considered.
The same recursive approach is also applied using the non-parametric
method proposed by Clauset, Shalizi and Newman (2009). This analysis
shows that the both distribution can apply to the upper portion of the
distribution of cities (above around the first 100 cities). Beyond these
cities, the upper tail conforms better to the Pareto distribution on the
grounds of statistical significance. When the truncation point is extended
to include smaller and smaller cities, it is not possible to disentangle the
two on the grounds of statistical significance, but on the grounds of the
27
size of the statistics. In general, the Pareto seems a better fit when we are
close to the upper portion of the data and the log-normal seems a better
fit when we approach the entire distribution. Also, the Pareto distribu-
tion seems to be longer than traditionally postulated by previous studies
on the grounds of an arbitrary truncation point.
These results seem to support to the claim by Eeckhout (2009) that an
arbitrary choice of the cut-off of the distribution may mislead scholars to
conclude in favor of one or the other distribution. While the log-normal
seems to best fit the entire sample, truncating the distribution may lead
to conclude in favor of a Pareto, especially in the upper tail. Even then,
however, the analysis returns a kind of non-monotonic behavior indicat-
ing that a Pareto might apply over more than one range of city sizes: in
the very upper tail and when the sample is truncated mid-way to the
distribution of all cities.
Finally, we assess whether the distribution of cities can potentially
fall into the weak or false power law categories defined by Perline (2005).
To this end, we replicate the proposed recursive rank-size and the non-
parametric alternative test of city size distributions using simulated data
drawn from a Pareto, a log-normal and a mixture of the two. While the
rank size regressions seem to point to the distribution of cities as poten-
tially a false power law with the log-normal simulated data displaying
a remarkably similar signature to the real data, the non parametric test
seems less conclusive. In this case, the size of the test statistics for the
simulated log-normal and the real data are also remarkably similar in the
very upper tail. Only when the tail is extended, the test seems to point
again in favor of the Pareto. Hence, the non-parametric test seems un-
able to settle whether the distribution of cities is a weak or a false power
law.
This analysis seems to provide novel methodological insights on the
discrimination between alternative city size distributions and the trun-
cation point problem. We are able to provide new and robust empirical
evidence in support of the claim of Eeckhout (2009) that the conclusion
in favor of the Pareto or log-normal may depend on the truncation point.
Similarly, we provide further evidence of the difficulty highlighted in
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part of the literature of distinguishing between the tail of a log-normal
and a power law tail for the population distribution of cities. However,
we also provide novel empirical evidence compared to the existing liter-
ature. In particular, our recursive rank size regressions show that Zipf’s
Law applies not just for the part of the distribution involving the largest
cities, but also for an intermediate range of cities that is far beyond the
upper tail. Importantly, this evidence is confirmed in the non-parametric
analysis. Moreover, we find that the so called “upper tail” of the distri-
bution may be considerably longer than what is traditionally found by
previous studies, a result that may have interesting implications for the
theoretical and policy debate related to the distribution of cities.
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Chapter 3
Are Gibrat and Zipf
Monozygotic or
Heterozygotic Twins? A
Comparative Analysis of
Means and Variances in
Complex Urban Systems
3.1 Gibrat’s Law vs Zipf’s Law: Preliminary Con-
siderations1
3.1.1 Preface
Cities all over the world offer an amazing variety in terms of size and
growth rates. Despite these differences, systems of cities do not exhibit a
1The current chapter is a repruduction of the paper already under reviewing “Are Gibrat
and Zipf Monozygotic or Heterozygotic Twins? A Comparative Analysis of Means and
Variances in Complex Urban Systems”, co-authored with Aura Reggiani of University of
Bologna and Peter Nijkamp of VU University of Amsterdam.
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random pattern, but a strict regularity in terms of urban hierarchies and
inter-urban connectivity. The genesis of such hierarchical perspectives
on city size and urban systems can already be found in the seminal con-
tributions of Christaller (1933) and Lo¨sch (1940). The validity of these
frameworks has extensively been tested in subsequent statistical exper-
iments in many countries around the world. The conceptual founda-
tion for the existence of central place hierarchies rests on various pillars:
agglomeration advantages in cities (depending on city size), smart spe-
cialization of industries (depending on scale advantages in different size
classes of cities), and transportation and logistics costs (depending on
distance frictions between cities or between cities and their hinterlands).
Urban hierarchies and inter-urban connectivity are therefore two sides of
the same coin (see Paelinck and Nijkamp 1976).
Clearly, it ought to be added that the spatial range of interurban link-
ages has extended drastically over recent decades. Whereas a century
ago, most cities were at best part of an interlinked regional or national
system, nowadays cities are often part of a globally connected network.
The underlying globalisation force field is not a random system either,
but strictly governed by economic efficiency determinants, in which glob-
ally connected service networks and commodity chains play a critical
role (see for fundamental contributions Neal (2012), Newman (2010)).
There is no doubt that we live in a highly connected world. This is high-
lighted in a study by Reggiani and Schintler (2005), who assert: “Our
modern world is in a continuous state of flux. Modern transport systems and
the emerging new style behaviours have created an unprecedented rise in mo-
bility, at all spatial levels. The ever rising mobility patterns apply to all types
of movement work, business, shopping and leisure, as well as to freight trans-
port. Globalisation certainly plays a key role in this dynamic framework” (p.1).
Globalization – which is defined as a broad area of increasing interna-
tionalization of markets, changing consumption patterns and shifting of
industrial activities all over the world – appears to form a common de-
nominator for consumer/user (economic) activities with an immediate
impact, namely, the emergence of a highly interconnected, interdepen-
dent and complex system of networks, or the rise of a complex network
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society. Consequently, mobility and migration – though continuously
changing – lead to the increasing phenomenon of urban agglomerations:
“Agglomeration and residential mobility of the population between different
geographic locations are tightly connected to economic activities” Eeckhout,
2004, p. 1429). Surprisingly, despite the complex evolution of current
socio-economic spatial networks, two robust empirical regularities seem
to hold: Gibrat’s law affirming that city growth does not depend on size,
and Zipf’s law stating the proportionality of a given city size to its rank.2
In the field of spatial economics, these two regularities have given
rise, especially since the late ’90s, to an increasing number of empirical
studies, testing cities and economic growth at various spatial levels (na-
tional, regional, local), by means of Gibrat’s law and Zipf’s law. In the
majority of urban studies, Zipf’s law and Gibrat’s law are generally con-
firmed by empirical data. For example, Eeckhout (2004) and Gonzalez-
Val (2010) test the validity of both laws for all US cities: the former in
the period 1990-2000, and the latter over the period 1900-2000; Ioannides
and Overman (2003) and Gabaix and Ioannides (2004) examine Gibrat’s
and Zipf’s laws in the US metropolitan areas over the same period (1900-
1990); and Giesen and Suedekum (2011) investigate both these laws, by
considering a sample of German cities with a population greater than
100,000 in the period 1975-1997. In contrast, only a few studies seem
to reject these two empirical regularities, in particular, Black and Hen-
derson (2003), who reject Gibrat’s law over a sample of US metropolitan
areas in the period 1900-1990, and Gonzalez-Val et al. (2012), who in their
study of all cities in the US, Italy and Spain over the 20th century, find
weak evidence of Gibrat’s law. These contrasting results have prompted
a continuous debate in the literature, on the (non)validity of Gibrat’s law
and/or Zipf’s law. In this context, recent work has shown that Gibrat’s
law can be generalized, in the sense that only the mean of the city growth
2Another way to refer to Zipf’s Law is a Pareto distribution, with a shape parameter
equal to 1. It is investigated using the so-called rank-size rule. We note here that the slope
coefficient of the rank-size rule represents the inverse form of the parameter of the conven-
tional Pareto distribution. For more details, we refer inter alia to Adamic (2000) and Parr
(1985). In this chapter we refer to Zipf’s law (Zipf’s distribution), when the rank-size coef-
ficient is exactly equal to 1. In all the other cases we refer to the rank-size rule (rank-size
distribution).
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is independent from city size, while its variance can change according to
size (Cordoba, 2003). Gibrat and Zipf have offered strong evidence on
population dynamics and hierarchies, respectively, boiling down to sim-
ple modeling perspectives on the evolution of urban systems in a given
country.
These two laws are often analyzed together, given their possible com-
plementarity. Indeed, Champernowne (1953) and Simon (1955) have
shown that rank-size distributions arise naturally, if Gibrat’s law is sat-
isfied. Gabaix (1999) has demonstrated that Gibrat’s law leads to a Zipf
distribution, while Cordoba (2003) argues that a weak version of Gibrat’s
law leads to more general rank-size distributions. Clearly, the question
emerges whether Zipf’s law (or its more general rank-size rule) is only
a static version of the more dynamic Gibrat’s law. Strictly speaking, it
might be hypothesized that Zipf’s law and the rank-size rule show fea-
tures of monozygotic twins, while Zipf’s law and Gibrat’s law show fea-
tures of heterozygotic twins, as the latter law is able to reveal distinct
modeling outcomes, even though in equilibrium it expresses identical
fundamental characteristics. A test of this proposition calls for evidence-
based research.
Starting from these considerations, the present chapter aims to an-
swer the following research question: can (a generalisation of) Gibrat’s
law allow us to infer Zipf’s law and vice versa, by empirically analyzing
the link between these two laws, in the context of urban growth, and,
in particular, the dynamics of city size distributions? In this framework,
particular attention will be paid to the role of the mean and variance
of the city population as a key indicator for assessing the validity (or
non-validity) of the generalised Gibrat’s law. Consistently with Eeck-
hout (2004), we focus our empirical investigation on the entire city size
distributions of five selected countries (Botswana, Germany, Hungary,
Luxembourg and Malta) and not only on the upper tail,3 as other studies
have done (see among others, Giesen and Suedekum, 2011; Guerin-Pace,
3Eeckhout (2004) shows that if the city growth does not depend on city size “then the
estimated OLS coefficient of the so-called rank-size rule varies depending on the truncation city
size, i.e. the inclusion of smaller (larger) cities in the sample, leads to a smaller (larger) coefficient”
(Fazio and Modica, 2012, p. 3).
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1995; Rosen and Resnick, 1980 and Soo, 2005). First, we are able to find
evidence of the existence of Gibrat’s Law for three out of the five pre-
selected countries; we then test the empirical relationship between the
(generalised) Gibrat’s law and Zipf’s law, by considering the dynamics
of the hierarchical structure of the various city systems, on the basis of
the mean and variance indicators.
The chapter is then organised as follows. In this section (Section 3.1),
we first summarise Gibrat’s law (Subsection 3.1.2) and Zipf’s law (Sub-
section 3.1.3); we then address the literature on the relationship between
these two laws (Subsection 3.1.4). This short review constitutes the ba-
sis for constructing our empirical analysis aimed at testing Gibrat’s law
vs Zipf’s law in specific case studies. Section 3.2 describes the rationale
underlying the selection of the five countries under analysis (Subsection
3.2.1 and 3.2.2), by focusing on their different spatial economic charac-
teristics and related statistics (Subsection 2.3), while subsequent sections
illustrate the results of the empirical analysis devoted to testing Gibrat’s
law (Section 3.3), as well as the link between Gibrat’s law and Zipf’s law
(Section 3.4). The chapter concludes with some methodological consid-
erations and directions for future research (Section 3.5).
3.1.2 Gibrat’s Law
In 1931, Gibrat observed that the growth rate of a citys population does
not depend on the size of the city. In other words, although cities can
grow at different rates, no systematic behaviour exists between their
growth and their size, so that, according to Gibrat (1931), we cannot af-
firm that larger cities grow faster than smaller ones or vice versa. More
formally, we can say that a log-normal distribution (or Gibrat distribu-
tion) arises (if certain conditions hold) “as the limiting distribution of the
product of positive random variates and the number of terms in the product
tends to infinity” (Chesher, 1979, p. 403). Analytically, we can write the
following logarithmic expression, as in Steindl (1968):
logP (t) = logP (0) + ε(1) + ε(2) + . . .+ ε(T ) (3.1)
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where P (t) is the size of a certain city at time t, P (0) is the initial pop-
ulation, and ε(t) is a random variable (indicating random shocks), i.i.d
random variable with mean µ and variance σ2. Equation (3.1) identifies
the logarithm of the size of a given city as the sum of the initial size and
past growth rates. It should be noted that this stochastic process leads to
the log-normal distribution (1) of the variable P (t), only if a sufficiently
strong condition holds, namely, the law of proportionate effect. This law
can now be interpreted as follows: “A variate subject to a process of change
is said to obey the law of proportionate effect if the change in the variate at any
step of the process is a random proportion of the previous value of the variate”
(Chesher, 1979, p. 403). The implication of Gibrat’s law is that the growth
processes of cities have “a common mean (equal to the mean city growth rate)
and a common variance” (Gabaix, 1999, p. 741), that is both the mean and
variance have to be independent from the size of the cities.
In economic terms, the above formula means that, if we impose noise
on a process, after a certain (long) time, the deterministic pattern gen-
erated by some fundamental structural variables appears again. This is
important, if we want to build models close to empirics; and hence: “eco-
nomic models that explain city size distribution by relying on characteristics of
hierarchies between cities, demand supply curves, technological considerations,
and the like are at best incomplete if they fail to satisfy Gibrat’s law in the end”
(Gabaix, 1999, p. 742).
However, Gibrat’s law is only a part of the story. Indeed, this law is
related to the rank-size rule, and, in particular, to Zipf’s law. The link
between the two regularities has been widely debated, because the pro-
portionate growth rate process (Gibrat’ law) gives rise, as Gibrat (1931)
stated, to the log-normal distribution (see (1)); the proportionality of the
size to the rank (Zipf’s law, or the more general rank-size rule) is associ-
ated, instead, with a Pareto4 distribution. Yet many studies have shown
that a random growth process can generate power laws5 (see Richardson,
1973, for a review).
4Note that the slope coefficient of the rank-size rule represents the inverse form of the
parameter of the conventional Pareto distribution. See, for more details, Adamic (2007) and
Parr (1985).
5The Zipf distribution is a particular distribution of the power law family.
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In the scientific literature, the link between a log-normal and Pareto
distribution is still a matter of controversy. According to several authors,
the Gibrat (log-normal) process can generate Zipf’s law only at the upper
tail distribution (see e.g. Blank and Solomon, 2000; Eeckhout, 2004, 2009;
Levy, 2009), as already outlined by Parr and Suzuki in 1973 (p. 343):
“truncation of the log-normal at an appropriately high level enables the trun-
cated portion to be regarded as not significantly different from the rank-size dis-
tribution. Furthermore: these distributions all belong to the same family and in
the upper tail are similar and consistent with the rank-size rule. Lower parts of
these distributions, however, often exhibit significant differences and frequently
do not conform to the rank-size rule” (Carrol, 1982, p. 5). However, Gabaix
(1999) has shown that the presence of an infinitesimally small barrier, on
an identical growth process across sizes, necessarily leads to a Zipf dis-
tribution (see also Subsection 1.4 below). Against this methodological
background, we briefly review in the next section the formal definition
of Zipf’s law and its spatial economic interpretations.
3.1.3 Zipf’s Law
The second well-known spatial regularity is given by the so-called Zipf’s
law (on the basis of a first study by Auerbach6 in 1913). In 1949, Zipf ob-
served and established that the sizes of the cities in a country are propor-
tional to their rank. This means that for example, in Botswana, the size
of Gaborone is roughly twice the size of Francistown, the second largest
city, three times the third largest city, Molopolole, and so on. Formally,
this can be written as:
P = KR−ρi (3.2)
Equation 3.2 is known as the rank-size rule and is usually expressed in
logarithmic form, as follows:
logPi = logK − ρ logRi (3.3)
6“The population of a city is inversely proportional to the number indicating its rank among the
cities of a given country” (Auerbach, 1915, p. 384).
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where Pi is the population of city i, Ri is the rank of the ith-city and K
is a constant. Zipf’s law holds precisely, when the coefficient ρ is equal
to one.7 Several interpretations of the Zipf coefficient, ρ, have been pro-
posed in the literature. In principle, the ρ-coefficient can be seen as an
indicator of the hierarchical degree of a system of cities (Singer, 1930). In
fact the ρ-coefficient measures how unequal the city distribution is: the
higher the ρ-coefficient, the more unequally distributed is the city sys-
tem. On the contrary, the smaller the value of ρ, the more even is the
system of cities (in the extreme, when ρ = 0, we have a very even system
of cities all of the same size; when ρ = ∞, instead, we have only one
city hosting the entire population). Related to this interpretation, Singer
(1930) considers this ρ-coefficient as an index of metropolisation; in par-
ticular, this author affirms that the higher the ρ-coefficient, the more im-
portant is the urban land value. In the same vein, Parr (1985) shows the
existence of a U-shaped pattern of the Pareto coefficient (the counterpart
of the ρ-coefficient) over time; he establishes a link between the over-
all level of development and the degree of metropolisation, that is, the
more developed a country, the greater will be the degree of metropoli-
sation. Interestingly, Parr (1985, p. 208) argues: “the process of concen-
tration is facilitated by (and ultimately dependent on) improved interurban
and interregional transportation”. Against this background, Brakman et
al. (2001) interpret ρ as an indicator of industrialisation and agglom-
eration economies, while more recently, Reggiani and Nijkamp (2012)
have considered the urban structure in a country as a socio-economic
connected network and interpret ρ as an indicator of economic devel-
opment by comparing it with the connectivity degree distribution8 in a
network.9
7Notice that here ρ = 1/q of the previous chapter.
8 “The degree distribution, P (k), gives the probability that a selected node has exactly k links”
(Barabasi and Oltvai, 2004, p.102).
9In particular, Reggiani and Nijkamp (2012) show the following: high values of the
connectivity degree distribution (> 3) match a random network, which corresponds to a
homogeneous urban setting, characterized by low values of ρ (< 0.5). Vice versa, small
values of the connectivity degree distribution (< 0.5) indicate a hub configuration in the
network, which corresponds to a high urban heterogeneity, expressed by a value of b > 1.
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In summary, Gibrat’s law expresses the growth process of a certain
variable (firm, city, income, wealth, etc.), independent of its size, while
Zipf’s law presents the static relationship of the size of this variable with
its rank. The main concern in the literature has been whether and how
Gibrat’s law and Zipf’s law are mutually linked, for example, by means
of the same formal model of the size distribution of the variable in hand,
within a given urban-spatial system. In the next section, we briefly out-
line the main methodological challenges which constitute the basis for
our subsequent empirical analysis.
3.1.4 The Relationship between Gibrats Law and Zipfs
Law
“It has long been noted, in economics since at least Champernowne (1953),...,
that random growth process could generate power laws” (Gabaix, 1999, p.
741). The debate on the two distributions is still very alive, mainly be-
cause it is a difficult task to identify the most discriminating between
these two, at least in the upper tail of the distribution (Perline, 2005). As
mentioned in Subsection 3.1.1, both are similar and consistent with the
rank-size rule in the upper tail (Carrol, 1982).
Many arguments have been put forward in the literature for explain-
ing distinct variations between these distributions. Here, we focus on
stochastic models, “perhaps the most influential theories bearing upon the
rank-size problem” (Carrol, 1982, p. 5). The stochastic approach mathemat-
ically derives certain distributions of city size by starting from a given
stochastic process; more precisely, these models postulate that differ-
ent distributions arise as the result of steady state outcomes of different
stochastic processes describing the underlying economic forces (Steindl,
1968). In particular, these models postulate that rank-size regularities
are the steady-state equilibria of the law of proportionate effect, namely
Gibrat’s law. Then proportional growth can explain the Pareto/Zipf dis-
tribution. In this section, we review the main models which have influ-
enced subsequent studies; for an extensive review, the reader can consult
Carrol (1982) and Suarez-Villa (1988).
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Champernowne (1953) presents a model on income distribution (this
can be adapted to city size as well) based on the stochastic process from
Markov chains.10 The model takes into consideration a stochastic ma-
trix, namely, a matrix where all probabilities of transition from a class of
income to another are reported. Furthermore, the model makes the as-
sumption of a constant number of incomes through time: “Under these
circumstances, and provided certain other conditions11 are satisfied, the distri-
bution will tend towards a unique equilibrium distribution dependent upon the
stochastic matrix but not on the initial size” (Champernowne, 1953, p. 318).
This model is able to explain the Pareto distribution for income size.
Simon (1955) proposes, instead, an interesting study on the class of
skew distribution functions. He shows how a preferential attachment
process, that is a law of proportionate effect with a constant probability
that new small units enter at any time in the process, leads to a class
of skewed distributions, incorporating among them both the Pareto and
log-normal distribution.
Gabaix (1999, p. 750) presents a model with a random walk with a
small barrier “and, more interestingly, that, as the barrier become lower, the
exponent (of the Pareto distribution) converges to 1. So, in essence, all we need
is an infinitesimally small barrier, to ensure that the steady state distribution
will be Zipf”. Thus, Gabaix’s model shows that a proportional growth
process can lead to an exact Zipf distribution.
All of the above mentioned studies have provided one important con-
tribution to the literature: under plausible conditions,12 a proportion-
ate growth process can lead to a Pareto/Zipf distribution. In summary,
Champernowne’s model (1953) established that a proportional growth
process leads to the limit of a Pareto distribution. Simon’s model (1955)
generalises Champernowne’s results, proving that Gibrat’s law can lead
to different skewed distributions, one of which is Pareto. Finally, Gabaix
10Recall that Gibrat’s law can be interpreted as a Markov process.
11In particular, the stability condition used in this model implies a quite unrealistic neg-
ative expected value of a change in income (Steindl, 1968).
12In particular, a) negative expected change of income in Champernowne (1955); b)
steady inflow of new and small cities in Simon (1955); and c) lower barrier for Gabaix
(1999).
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(1999) shows that Gibrat’s law can lead to an exact Zipf distribution (see
also Cordoba, 2003).
However, despite the extensive literature on Gibrat’s law, according
to Kalecki (1945), the model proposed by Gibrat, although formally cor-
rect, has implications that are not very realistic, particularly in relation to
the variance.13
Kalecki (1945) assumes that the variance of the random variable ε(t)
in Eq. (3.1) changes over time for three reasons: (i) the variance may
change due to economic forces only; (ii) the variance may increase purely
due to the influence of random shocks, and (iii) the variance may change
due to both economic forces and random shocks. He thus proposes a
model in which there is a negative correlation between the size P and the
random variable ε(t) (in Eq. (3.1)). In this way, as size increases (as time
grows), the random shocks are smaller, thus preventing the tendency of
the variance to increase. In this context, Cordoba (2008, p. 1463) proposes
a: “generalization of Gibrat’s law that allows size to affect the variance of the
growth process but not its mean”. In particular, one of the implications of
Cordoba’s generalized model is that non-proportionality of the variance
is required to take into account a ρ-coefficient different from one (in Eq.
(3.3)). More specifically, the larger the ρ-coefficient, the more unequal is
the distribution, and this makes a growth process more volatile.14 On
the basis of Cordoba’s results, we can outline the following relationships
between Zipf’s law and Gibrat’s law:
• (a) If ρ = 1, Zipf’s law holds. In order that Gibrat’s law applies,
neither the mean nor the variance of growth can depend on size.
• (b) If rho > 1, the distribution is more unequal. In order that
Gibrat’s law applies, it is necessary that the mean is independent
of the city size, but not the variance; indeed, the associated growth
13The law of proportionate effect, indeed, assumes that a given variable P (t) changes by
a random and independent effect amount as time goes by; so even though it is realistic that
the mean remains constant as t increases, the same is not true for the variance because it
should increase instead.
14The volatility is a measure of fluctuation of a process. We will use the variance as an
indicator of the volatility of an underlying proportionate growth process.
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process requires that smaller cities face a greater volatility of growth
than larger cities.
• (c) If rho < 1, the distribution is more evenly distributed. Again, in
order that Gibrat’s law applies, it is necessary that the mean is inde-
pendent of the city size, but not the variance. Here, the associated
growth process requires that larger cities face a greater volatility of
growth than smaller cities.
Starting from these considerations, the main challenge and aim of this
chapter is to empirically explore the above mentioned relationship “Gibrat’s
law vs Zipf’s law”, according to the three statements (a)-(c) above. It
should be noted that empirical investigations of the relationship “Gibrat’s
law vs Zipf’s law” are still rare. We may refer here, amongst others,
to studies on firm growth (see Fujiwara et al. 2003), and studies on
city growth (Berry and Okulicz-Kozarin 2012; Dittmar 2011; Giesen and
Suedekum 2011). All of these analyses have mainly focused on the first
item, (a), the relationship between Zipf and Gibrat. To the best of our
knowledge, no empirical application has focused, so far, on how (par-
tial) deviations from either law can affect the other law; in other words,
on statements (b) and (c).
Given these propositions, we aim to test items (a)-(c) in the context of
urban dynamics, by examining urban patterns in countries which exhibit
different spatial-economic characteristics. Our methodology includes two
main steps: (i) we first analyse Gibrat’s law for the set of cities in the se-
lected countries (Section 3.3), in order to (ii) construct a validation frame-
work to assess the relationship Gibrat’s vs Zipf’s law (Section 3.4 ). In
Section which follows, we will first describe the characteristics of our
case studies, in particular the countries to be investigated.
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Table 2: Spatial Economic Characteristics of the Five Countries under Anal-
ysis
Country Year
Km2 Pop.
Density
% Urban % Pop. Car (per Railway Roadway
GDP p.c. Growth
Total
(thousands) (milions) pop. growth (1000 (1000 Investment
people) Km Km
Botswana 2011 581 1.85 3.19 62.00% 1.47 133 0.90 25.80 9,481 5.1% 21.52%
Germany 2007 357 81.78 229 74.00% -0.20 564 41.90 644.50 40,403 2.7% 19.26%
Hungary 2011 93 9.99 107.4 69.00% -0.18 347 8.10 197.50 3,045 1.70% 19.07%
Luxembourg 2011 2,5 0.51 205.6 85.00% 1.13 739 0.27 5.20 106,958 1.00% 21.17%
Malta 2009 0.32 0.42 1,338 94.00% 0.36 679 0 3.10 20,437 -2.70% 15.80%
3.2 Choice of Case Studies: Descriptive Analy-
sis and Statistics
3.2.1 Preface
Given our empirical objective, aiming to analyse Gibrat’s vs Zipf’s law
in different spatial socio-economic landscapes, the rationale underlying
the choice of our case studies is the following. We have selected five
distinct countries characterised by different typologies, according to five
main distinguishing criteria: (a) OECD vs non-OECD country; (b) ad-
vanced economy vs non-advanced economy; (c) centrally located vs non-
centrally located; (d) size of surface; and (e) increasing vs decreasing
population. On this basis, we have identified five countries: Botswana,
Germany, Hungary, Luxembourg and Malta for study.15 In Table 2 we re-
port, for each country, some economic indicators (such a GDP per capita,
growth rate and percentage of investment over GDP), as well as some
other important indicators for the mobility and transportation system
(such as the length of railways and roadways, and the number of cars
per thousand people).
Some points are worth noting here. Botswana is the only non-OECD
country, while all the others are OECD countries. Botswana shows the
features of a non-advanced16 economy; however, it exhibits a trend to-
wards an increase in population and economic growth. Germany was a
founding member of the European Community in 1957 (which became
15Alphabetic order.
16According to the IMF classification.
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the European Union (EU) in 1993); it is central in Europe and is a large
country in terms of surface area and population, with an advanced econ-
omy. Hungary joined the EU in 2004; it is located in central Europe, but
shows a non-advanced economy and a decreasing population. Luxem-
bourg, like Germany, was a founding member of the European Com-
munity in 1957; it is a small country, but very central in Europe with a
high income per capita. Malta, like Hungary, joined the EU in 2004; it is a
small, peripheral country but with an advanced economy; it is also one of
the most densely populated countries worldwide. Clearly, other choices
could have been made, but the present set of countries should represent
a sufficiently interesting collection of cases for in-depth investigation.
We will now concisely outline the major economic and demographic
characteristics of these countries (Subsection 3.2.2). We will then show
some descriptive statistics and we will offer a descriptive analysis (Sub-
section 3.2.3).
3.2.2 Profiles of Case Studies
In this section we will describe a few characteristic features of the urban
system of five case countries further analysed in our study.
Botswana is the largest country in the sample in terms of size: it is
around 581,000 sq. km, but with a very low population density: 3.19 in-
habitants per sq. km. Furthermore, it is poor in terms of transport infras-
tructures and of number of cars per 1,000 people; the urban population
covers only 61
Germany, instead, is the most developed country from an economic
point of view. It has the largest population in Europe and is also large in
terms of surface area, 357,000 sq. km. Moreover, it is the second densest
country in our case studies. It also has very good infrastructures.
Hungary is a mid-sized country with a low degree of transport in-
frastructures and a low average number of cars per inhabitant. The pop-
ulation density is low and also the number of urbanised people is low.
Luxembourg is a small but rich country, highly connected with the
rest of Europe. It has one of the largest ratios of number of cars to pop-
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ulation size. In terms of GDP per capita it is the richest country in our
sample.
Finally, Malta is the smallest country of our data-set in terms of both
population and surface area; however, the population density is huge
and this is reflected in the number of urbanised people.
3.2.3 Data and Descriptive Statistics
We collected data from the National Institute of Statistics for all five of
these countries.17 In particular, we collected data from the Central Statis-
tics Office of Botswana, the Institute for Employment Research18 (IAB) in
Germany), the Hungarian Central Statistical Office, the STATEC-Institute
National de la Statistique et des Etudes Economique of Luxembourg, and
the National Statistique Office of Malta.
It should be noted that an extensive debate concerns the type of unit
under analysis: several studies have been carried out using metropolitan
areas, i.e. by considering the entire population in a given city, as well as
all populations of suburban areas. Nevertheless, here we aim to carry out
an analysis as comparable as possible between the five countries, by also
including, as much as possible, all the cities in a given country. For these
reasons, we consider in our analysis the entities legally defined as cities
or villages in their countries, although we are aware that the administra-
tive definition given by legal borders might not fulfill our scopes exactly.
In order to have a comparable unit, in all countries we have selected
those localities which are similar to a municipality.19
Another concern is due to the fact that we have different temporal
horizons, which, sometimes, are short. This is the case for Botswana,
where we have only two census observations (2000 and 2010), as well as
for Hungary, where, although the time span is 30 years (1980-2011), we
have only four census observations. For Germany, however, although
17For all countries we have data over all cities from the biggest to the smallest one.
18The authors wish to thank Uwe Blien and Anette Haas (IAB, Germany), for kindly
providing the data used in our study on German cities (Sections 3.3 and 3.4).
19We encountered some difficultly in making the right choice for Botswana where we
also had data for small localities but we chose to collect all localities with ID code 100,
namely villages and cities.
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics of the Five Countries under Analysis
Country Year N. cities ln (Mean) ln (Variance) ln (Median) Skewness Kurtosis
Botswana 2011 461 7.15 1.22 6.97 0.78 2.23
Germany 2007 12,262 7.42 1.50 7.30 0.34 0.17
Hungary 2011 3,154 6.75 1.34 6.70 0.40 0.95
Luxemburg 2011 116 7.81 0.92 7.61 0.86 1.45
Malta 2009 68 8.35 0.93 8.29 -0.59 0.31
the time span is 15 years, we have annual data (1993-2007), so we can
conduct a more precise analysis. Finally, Luxembourg and Malta have
a long time series considering all census data from 1821 until 2011 for
Luxembourg, and from 1901 to 2009 for Malta; unfortunately the time
span between two subsequent observations is not constant even in the
same country and especially before World War II.
In Table 3 we report some descriptive statistics. First, it is interesting
to notice that the median for the five different countries reflects the per-
centage of urban people in any single country: Malta shows the largest
median, 3,983 inhabitants, and we recall that the urbanisation in this
country is over 90%; Luxembourg has a median of 2,018 people and an
urban population of over 80%. Hungary shows the smallest median, 812
people, with a relatively low urbanization rate, 68%.
Secondly, we report the (log) mean. In all five countries the mean is
greater than the median which indicates asymmetry. The asymmetry of
the distribution is also confirmed by the skewness. In general, in city size
probability distributions, we expect a positive skewness, which denotes
the fact that most of the observations lie on the left of the distribution. As
a consequence, the left tail is longer: this means that we expect a greater
number of small cities than large ones. In our sample this is true for four
countries: Botswana, Germany, Hungary and Luxembourg, while Malta
shows a negative skewness,20 thus indicating a greater concentration of
20Negative skewness might be seen as a contradiction with a mean greater than the me-
dian, but this is not the case. For example, von Hippel (2005) argues: “the mean is right of
the median under right skew, and left of the median under left skew. This rule fails with surprising
frequency... It can fail in distributions where one tail is long but the other is heavy. Most commonly,
the rule fails in discrete distributions where the areas to the left and right of the median are not
45
large cities. The reason for this is likely due to the huge urbanization rate
in that country that pushes the concentration of people into large centres
and this is magnified by the small size of Malta.
Kurtosis is a measure of peakedness of the distribution. In all our
case studies, the value of kurtosis is positive: this indicates a situation
in which the distributions show heavy tails and peakedness with refer-
ence to a normal distribution (whereas negative kurtosis indicates light
tails and flatness). We notice the presence of fat tails and peakedness
especially in Botswana (which shows the highest positive kurtosis21).
Following on from the above observations, in Section 3.3 we focus our
attention on the validity of Gibrat’s law, in order to design an analytical
framework that is useful for meeting the ultimate goal of our analysis: a
comparison of Gibrat’s law and Zipf’s law.
3.3 Testing Gibrat’s Law: Method and Results
3.3.1 Preface
Given our objective first to test the validity of Gibrat’s law in the five
countries concerned (Botswana, Germany, Hungary, Luxembourg and
Malta), in this section we show the adopted methods and the related
results. In particular, we consider two different methodologies: (i) para-
metric analysis (Subsection 3.3.2); and (ii) non-parametric analysis (Sub-
section 3.3.3). Concerning the parametric technique, we search for devi-
ations of sizes from their mean, first in a cross-sectional setting (Model A
in Subsection 3.3.2) and then in a longitudinal setting (Model B in Sub-
section 3.3.2). Concerning the non-parametric technique, we look at the
mean and variance of the size, given the initial size (Subsection 3.3.3).
equal”. Our case covers both.
21De Carlo (1997, p. 294), in an interesting note on kurtosis, affirms: “it represents a
movement of mass that does not affect the variance. Consider the case of positive kurtosis, where
heavier tails are often accompanied by a higher peak. Note that if mass is simply moved from the
shoulders of a distribution to its tails, then the variance will also be larger. To leave the variance
unchanged, one must also move mass from the shoulders to the centre, which gives a compensating
decrease in the variance and a peakl”.
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3.3.2 Parametric Analysis
Model A: OLS Regression
In this section we use an OLS regression model and report the results
from the parametric analysis. We check dynamic deviations from the
proportionality of mean growth and variance to size, by using a method
firstly proposed by Kalecki (1945) and subsequently utilized, among oth-
ers, by Bottazzi et al. (2001). In particular, the adopted model is the fol-
lowing OLS model:
gti = βig
t−1
i + νi (3.4)
where gti is the deviation of the logarithm of the population of city
i from the mean of the logarithms of the city populations at time t, and
ν is the error term. β is the parameter to be estimated and “provides an
estimate of the divergence/convergence of the size distribution toward its mean”
(Bottazzi et al., 2001, p. 1184). Gibrat’s law holds if β is equal to one.22
When β is lower than one, this means that size converges towards its
mean, namely, the larger a city, the smaller the expected growth. On the
contrary, when β is greater than one, the larger a city and the larger the
expected growth. We test the model for each time-step.
As an indicator of the volatility of the growth process, we use the vari-
ance ratio, θt, between the variance of g at time t, σ(gt), and the variance
of g at time t− 1, σ(gt−1):
θt =
σ2(gti)
σ2(gt−1i )
(3.5)
If the variance is stable along two subsequent years, the variance ra-
tio, will be close to unity.
Results of the estimation of Eq. 3.4 and Eq. 3.5 are reported in Table
4 and Table 5 . Two main conclusions arise from here. Firstly, looking
22We report here only the condition on the estimated β. However it should be noted that
another condition is necessary to affirm that Gibrat’s law is in operation, indeed the error
terms have to be serially uncorrelated. We, then, add one more lag in Eq. (3.4) to verify this
additional condition. In most of the cases the error terms result serially uncorrelated.
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Table 4: Model A Estimates (Countries: Botswana, Germany, Hungary and
Luxembourg; Different Years)
Country Year β Robust s.e. θt R2 N. obs.
Botswana 2011 .995** .0149 1.0782 .92 460
Germany 1994 .999 .0003 1.0009 .99 12,280
1995 .999* .0002 .9983 .99 12,291
1996 .999* .0003 .9987 .99 12,291
1997 .998 .0002 .9978 .99 12,291
1998 .998 .0002 .9984 .99 12,291
1999 1.00 *** .0003 1.0011 .99 12,293
2000 .999*** .0003 .9998 .99 12,294
2001 1.001 .0001 1.0024 .99 12,294
2002 1.001 .0001 1.0017 .99 12,294
2003 1.00* .0001 1.0009 .99 12,293
2004 1.001 .0001 1.0027 .99 12,292
2005 1.001 .0001 1.0031 .99 12,293
2006 1.001 .0001 1.0027 .99 12,993
2007 1.001 .0002 1.0039 .99 12,259
Hungary 1990 1.055 .0019 1.1215 .99 3,121
2001 1.034 .0022 1.0806 .99 3,121
2011 1.028 .0025 1.0674 .99 3,121
Luxembourg 1851 .941* .0264 .9557 .93 116
1871 .993** .0276 1.0779 .92 116
1880 1.005 ** .0306 1.0667 .95 116
1890 1.048 .0183 1.0855 .93 116
1900 1.109 .0324 1.2833 .96 116
1910 1.079 .0187 1.1803 .99 116
1922 1.01** .0123 1.0473 .97 116
1930 1.103 .019 1.2406 .98 116
1935 1.001*** .007 1.0059 .99 116
1947 1.014* .0061 1.0355 .99 116
1960 1.069 .0132 1.1725 .98 116
1970 1.044 .0156 1.1198 .97 116
1981 1.016** .0144 1.0576 .98 116
1991 .993 ** .0104 .9964 .99 116
2001 0.955 .0076 .9199 .99 116
2002 0.994 .0015 .989 .99 116
2003 .995** .0034 .9926 .99 116
2004 .997** .0018 .9947 .99 116
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Table 5: (...continued) Model A Estimates (Countries: Botswana, Germany,
Hungary and Luxembourg; Different Years)
Country Year β Robust s.e. θt R2 N. obs.
Luxembourg 2005 .996** .0024 .9926 .99 116
2006 .997** .0015 .9961 .99 116
2007 0.992 .0029 .9851 .99 116
2008 0.992 .0023 .985 .99 116
2009 .996** .0019 .994 .99 116
2010 .996* .0016 .9924 .99 116
2011 .999** .0015 1.00 .99 11
Malta 1921 0.836* .0770 .7891 .89 51
1931 1.008** .0151 1.0306 .99 54
1948 .912** .0582 .9684 .86 54
1957 1.018* .0249 1.0808 .96 55
1967 .987** .0163 .9853 .99 56
1985 .936** .0423 .9732 .90 59
1995 .941* .0265 .9407 .94 63
2000 .991** .0057 .9840 .99 67
2001 .997** .0015 .9959 .99 68
2002 .995* .0010 .9920 .99 68
2003 .996 .0008 .9931 .99 68
2004 .997 .0008 .9950 .99 68
2005 .992** .0220 1.0055 .98 68
2006 .998** .0013 .9967 .99 68
2007 1.01 .0035 1.0210 .99 68
2008 1.001** .0012 1.0027 .99 68
2009 1.003* .0016 1.0069 .99 68
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at the parameter β, Gibrat’s law does not always hold (over time). Ger-
many, Luxembourg and Malta (especially the latter two) are clear exam-
ples of this intermittency: we can see periods where Gibrat’s law holds
and others where it does not. Secondly, it seems that the effect of the
(non)validity of the law is lengthy: namely, Gibrat’s law in general holds
(or does not hold) continuously for two or three time windows. Conse-
quently, the first result of our analysis is that testing Gibrat’s law requires
a data-set of considerable length, or as many possible observations as we
can. It is also interesting to note that in general, when Gibrat’s law does
not apply, the variance at time t is higher than the variance at the pre-
vious times; this is denoted by the parameter θ in Eq. 3.5 greater than
one. This is, of course, consistent with the idea of Gabaix (1999) which,
according to Gibrat’s law, both the mean and variance of the growth rate
have to be independent with respect to the size.
In more detail, by observing β in Tables 4 and 5 , we can see that in
Botswana, Luxembourg and Malta, Gibrat’s law holds quite often (β =
1). In Germany it does not apply more than half of the time and in Hun-
gary Gibrat’s law never holds.
This analysis, although intuitive, presents some shortcomings due to
the fact that it does not allow all the temporal aspects to be included.
In particular, even though it is good to have yearly observations, some
doubt about the validity of the above method can arise when the time
windows are longer. For this reason, as previously anticipated, we uti-
lize a further parametric technique (model B), firstly suggested by Clark
and Stabler (1991) and adopted, among others, by Black and Henderson
(2003). The emerging results are illustrated in the next section.
Model B: The Unit Root Test Approach
The starting point of the second, complementary, parametric method is
that testing for proportional growth implies testing for a unit root pro-
cess. In other words, we are looking for the presence of mean reversion
in the stochastic growth process. Mean reversion is a mathematical con-
cept denoting that a process of both high and low growth is temporarily
present and that population growth will tend to move to the average
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Table 6: Model B Estimates for the Five Countries
Country γ Robust s.e. Time span N. obs.
Botswana .99569** .0149 10 460
Germany 1.00026 .0002 15 172,049
Hungary 1.03855 .0013 31 9,363
Luxembourg 1.00919** .0065 190 2,900
Malta .97780** .0113 108 1,071
growth over time. Following Black and Henderson (2003) we use:
ln(P ti ) = α+ δ
t−1 + γ lnP t−1i + 
t
i (3.6)
where, α is a constant, δt−1 are fixed time effects, P ti is the population
of city i at time t and t − 1. γ is the parameter to be estimated and if
Gibrat’s law holds, it implies that γ = 1.23 Black and Henderson (2003)
argue that this null hypothesis does not permit an auto-regressive pro-
cess to the error so pooling OLS suffices. The results are summarised in
Table 6.
In general Gibrat’s law holds for those countries where Gibrat ap-
plies cross-sectionally more than a half time:24 Botswana, Luxembourg
and Malta. In Germany, although the estimated parameter, γ, is very
close to unity, it is significantly different from one because of the very
small standard error. Finally, in this case, Hungary does not indicate the
presence of Gibrat’s law.
In summary, according to both parametric methods A and B, the ur-
ban dynamics of Botswana, Luxembourg and Malta seem to capture Gib-
rat’s law, while Gibrat’s law does not appear to be appropriate for the ur-
ban evolution underlying Germany and Hungary.
Given this preliminary analysis of Gibrat’s law, based on paramet-
ric methods, we explore the validity of these first results, by means of
23A value of γ lower than one implies mean reversion.
24See Tables 4 and 5.
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a non-parametric analysis. Non-parametric analysis provides an impor-
tant tool to explore directly the independence of the mean and variance
of the growth from the size. In this way we can gain an indication of the
behaviour of the mean and variance.
3.3.3 Non-Parametric Analysis
In this section we show the results of the non-parametric analysis strictly
based on Ioannides and Overman (2003). We use the normalized growth
rate, namely the difference between a city’s growth rate and the mean
city growth rate, all divided by the standard deviation of growth. The
strength of non-parametric estimation is that we do not impose any rela-
tionship between the dependent and independent variables. According
to Cameron and Trivedi (2005, p. 294), we: “let the data show the shape of the
relationship”; this is an especially convenient approach when we do not
know a priori the correct distribution of the data. In our analysis, we will
use the Nadaraya-Watson (NW) method (Nadarya 1964; Watson 1964),
where the bandwidths are calculated with an optimal rule of thumb.25
If Gibrat’s law holds, the non-parametric estimation of the condi-
tional mean and variance should be stable across different population
sizes. Furthermore, because of normalization, we expect the conditional
mean growth to be equal to zero, and the conditional variance of growth
equal to one. It should be noted that, while the standard parametric re-
gression methods provide only an aggregate relationship between growth
and size which is constrained to hold over the entire distribution of city
sizes, the non-parametric estimates allow the growth to vary with size
over the distribution.
In Figure 6 we show the NW estimator for conditional mean growth
(upper panel) and variance (lower panel) for the entire city size distribu-
tion. Following Cordoba (2003), the independence of the expected con-
ditional growth rate always has to be satisfied, while the variance can be
affected by the city size. In general, smaller cities face a faster growth
than larger ones. However, very quickly (in most cases), the conditional
25We refer readers to their papers for a more detailed description.
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mean appears to become stable. This evidence is consistent with the mo-
del of Gabaix (1999) where a truncation concerning the small cities is
necessary to have stationarity.
By considering the specific countries in Figure 6, Luxembourg and
Malta show a striking stationarity in mean and variance, so that we can
affirm that in these cases, Gibrat’s law holds. Botswana appears to face
a huge variability at the bottom of the distribution for both mean and
variance, but in the upper tail the evidence of independence of the mean
is striking too. Thus, in principle, we can also accept Gibrat’s law for
this country. We can, on the contrary, reject Gibrat’s law for Germany
and Hungary, by confirming the results emerging from the parametric
analysis (see Subsection 3.3.2).
This non-parametric test suffers from several shortcomings: firstly,
outliers have a huge impact on the results, in particular the variance
(Eeckhout, 2004; Gonzalez-Val et al., 2012); and secondly, we cannot di-
rectly compare the ρ-coefficient with Gibrat’s law.
For these reasons, after the previous tests that confirm Gibrat’s law
for Botswana, Luxembourg and Malta, the final methodological step is
the analysis of the relationship between Gibrat’s law and rank-size/Zipf’s
law, by considering, as key indicators, the dynamics of the ρ-coefficient,
the β-parameter and the θ-parameter; in other words, the evolution of
the dynamics of economic development of the country. This will be re-
ported in the next section.
3.4 Gibrat’s Law and Zipf’s Law: A Compara-
tive Study
3.4.1 Role of the Adopted Parameters
In the previous sections we have shown that Botswana, Luxembourg and
Malta seem to obey Gibrat’s law, while this seems not to be the case for
Germany and Hungary. The final step in our analysis is then the investi-
gation of the relationship between Gibrat’s law and the rank-size/Zipf’s
law, by means of the rules (a), (b) and (c) (outlined in Subsection 3.1.4).
54
From the operational viewpoint, we investigate the relationship be-
tween the ρ-coefficient in Eq. (3.3) and the estimated parameters β and θ
from Eqs. (3.4) and (3.5), on the basis of Cordoba’s propositions (a); (b)
and (c) (Subsection 3.1.4). In particular, we estimate the ρ-coefficients in
the rank-size rule (3.3) by means of a modification proposed by Gabaix
and Ibragimov (2011), according the following:
logPi = logK − b logRi − 0.5 (3.7)
where Pi,K, q andRi are the same as in Eq. (3.3). In Tables 7 and 8 we
report the estimated ρ-coefficients and the parameters β and θ, according
to Eqs. (3.7), (3.4) and (3.5), respectively, for each of the five countries.
Concerning the coefficient ρ (Eq. 3.7), it should be noted that we inter-
pret the ρ-coefficient as a measure of hierarchy of city size distribution.
In this sense a positive change in the estimated ρ-coefficient denotes a sit-
uation where larger cities have grown more than smaller ones (in relative
terms); thus an increasing ρ-coefficient (see Eq. 3.3) reflects the tendency
towards agglomeration economies in the country at hand (see Subsection
3.1.4).
It is interesting to also pay attention to the β-parameter (see Eq. (3.4)),
which is the degree of divergence of the size distribution from its mean:
a β-value lower than one indicates that larger cities have an expected
growth lower than smaller ones. We note here that the condition β=1
indicates the validity of Gibrat’s law (Bottazzi et al. 2001).
Finally, the parameter θ reflects the ratio between variance at time t
and t − 1 (see Eq. (3.5)). This provides a measure of the volatility of
the growth process as a θ-value equal to one indicates the stability of the
variance between years.
Overall, by means of these three parameters, we can experiment with
the propositions (a), (b) and (c) in Subsection 3.1.4. For example, an in-
creasing/decreasing ρ-coefficient – indicating changes in the growth rate
between large and small cities – should lead to a generalized Gibrat’s
law. It appears then that the ρ-coefficients, together with the β- and θ-
parameters, offer insights into different aspects of the same growth pro-
cess: the ρ-coefficient captures the output of the growth process, while
55
the β- and θ-parameters take into account the mean and variance of the
growth process, respectively. In the latter context (regarding the role of
the mean and variance), it seems worthwhile to test the different dynam-
ics of the large cities vs the small cities, in order to explore in more detail
where a greater volatility shows up. We can then split, for each coun-
try, our sample into two halves by defining two sub-samples; one for
the large cities and the other one for the smaller cities. We then estimate
the parameters β and θ, according to Eqs. (3.4) and (3.5) respectively,
for these two sub-samples. In this way we can analyse, firstly, whether
Gibrat’s law holds separately for large and small cities; and, secondly,
whether the growth process is more volatile. We recall that, according to
Cordoba (2003), in order to preserve a Pareto/Zipf coefficient different
from one, the underlying growth process has to be different for smaller
and larger cities (Subsection 3.1.4).
In the next sections, the role of the various parameters ρ, β and θ in
capturing the relationship “rank-size rule vs Gibrat’s law” will be illus-
trated with reference to the empirical analyses in each of the five coun-
tries.
3.4.2 Botswana
Starting with Botswana, we can see that the estimated ρ-coefficient is
greater than one for both the years 2001 and 2011, indicating a predom-
inance of larger cities. In particular, in 2011 the estimated ρ-coefficient
is slightly greater than that one in 2001, thus showing a tendency – in
the last decade – towards a higher economic development. By consid-
ering the relationship with Gibrat’s law, we then investigate condition
b) of Subsection 3.1.4. Considering the entire sample, we have already
shown that Gibrat’s law holds in 2011 with an estimated β-parameter
not significantly different from one (β = 0.995∗∗).26 However, consider-
ing the two sub-samples, we find evidence of Gibrats law for large cities
(βBIG = 0.979∗∗) but not for small ones (βsmall = 0.761). This indicates
that larger cities of the sub-sample of small cities (i.e. medium size cities)
26Where ∗∗ indicates a significance level at 5%.
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Table 7: The Zipf and Gibrat Parameters (Countries: Botswana, Germany,
Hungary and Luxembourg; Different Years)
Country Year ρ-coeff. Robust s.e. β θ βBIG θBIG βsmall θsmall N. obs.
Botswana 2001 1.137 .0746 - - - - - - 464
2011 1.173 .0746 .995** 1.0078 .979** 1.000 0.761 1.011 461
Germany 1993 1.399 .0178 - - - - - - 12,280
1994 1.397 .0178 .999 1.0009 .996 .994 1.001** 1.009 12,291
1995 1.396 .0178 .999* .9983 .996 .994 1.00** 1.004 12,291
1996 1.394 .0177 .999* .9987 .997 .995 1.001** 1.006 12,291
1997 1.392 .0177 .998 .9978 .997 .994 .999** 1.002 12,291
1998 1.390 .0177 .998 .9984 .997 .994 .997** 1.000 12,293
1999 1.390 .0177 1.00 *** 1.0011 .998 .996 1.004 1.012 12,294
2000 1.390 .0177 .999*** .9998 .998 .998 .998** .998 12,294
2001 1.391 .0177 1.001 1.0024 .999 .999 1.002 1.006 12,294
2002 1.392 .0177 1.001 1.0017 .999** .999 1.00** 1.002 12,294
2003 1.392 .0177 1.00* 1.0009 .999** 1.001 .998 .998 12,293
2004 1.393 .0177 1.001 1.0027 1.000** 1.001 1.001 1.004 12,293
2005 1.396 .0178 1.001 1.0031 1.001 1.002 1.001** 1.003 12,293
2006 1.398 .0178 1.001 1.0027 1.001 1.001 .999** 1.000 12,293
2007 1.401 .0178 1.001 1.0039 1.002 1 1.001 1.005 12262
Hungary 1980 1.129 .0285 - - - - - - 3,121
1990 1.186 .0300 1.055 1.12 1.018 1.046 1.076 1.194 3,121
2001 1.223 .0309 1.034 1.08 0.993 .999 1.054 1.151 3,121
2011 1.258 .0316 1.028 1.06 1.005 1.020 1.010** 1.070 3,154
Luxembourg 1821 .5031 .0660 - - - - - - 116
1851 .4965 .0652 .941* .9557 .949** .978 .730 .764 116
1871 .5154 .0676 .993** 1.0779 .962** 1.070 .887** .981 116
1880 .5350 .0702 1.005 ** 1.0667 1.003** 1.060 .811** .871 116
1890 .5881 .0772 1.048 1.0855 .995** 1.160 .944** .965 116
1900 .6744 .0885 1.109 1.2833 1.115 1.340 .947** .969 116
1910 .7350 .0965 1.079 1.1803 1.091 1.210 .986** 1.035 116
1922 .7500 .0984 1.01** 1.0473 0.998** 1.025 1.042** 1.140 116
1930 .8377** .1100 1.103 1.2406 1.090 1.240 1.01** 1.048 116
1935 .8391** .1101 1.001*** 1.0059 .986** .976 1.033* 1.081 116
1947 .8543** .1121 1.014* 1.0355 1.013** 1.034 .982** 1.009 116
1960 .9252** .1214 1.069 1.1725 1.011** 1.059 1.006** 1.109 116
1970 .9735** .1278 1.044 1.1198 0.965 .963 1.016** 1.162 116
1980 .9923** .1302 1.016** 1.0576 0.942 .922 1.022** 1.150 116
1991 .9803** .1287 .993 ** .9964 0.949 .920 1.053** 1.145 116
2001 .9409** .1235 0.955 .9199 0.949 .907 .910 .871 116
2002 .9365* .1229 0.994 .989 .998** .997 .990** .983 116
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Table 8: The Zipf and Gibrat Parameters (Country: Malta; Different Years)
Country Year ρ-coeff. Robust s.e. β θ βBIG θBIG βsmall θsmall N. obs.
Luxembourg 2003 .9330** .1225 .995** .9926 1.00** 1.00 .997** 1.00 116
2004 .9302** .1221 .997** .9947 1.00** 1.00 1.00** 1.020 116
2005 .9270** .1217 .996** .9926 .995** .992 .992** .989 116
2006 .9253** .1215 .997** .9961 1.001 1.00 .994** .991 116
2007 .9195** .1207 0.992 .9851 0.994 .988 .974** .955 116
2008 .9140** .1200 0.992 .985 .999** .998 .976 .955 116
2009 .9120** .1197 .996** .994 1.00** 1.00 .989** .981 116
2010 .9094** .1194 .996* .9924 1.00** 1.00 .986* .974 116
2011 .9094** .1194 .999** 1.00 1.00** 1.00 .997** .996 116
Malta 1901 .9883** .1957 - - - - - - 51
1921 .8799** .1693 0.836* .7891 .893** 0.874 .487 .624 54
1931 .8838** .1700 1.008** 1.0306 .959** 0.965 1.067** 1.184 54
1948 .8591** .1638 .912** .9684 .714 0.852 .689** .678 55
1957 .8760** .1655 1.018* 1.0808 .769 0.673 1.073** 1.238 56
1967 .8939** .1645 .987** .9853 .961** 0.955 .954** .940 59
1985 .8305** .1479 .936** .9732 .573 0.510 .915** 1.02 63
1995 .8038** .1388 .941* .9407 .654 0.656 .923** .912 67
2000 .8005** .1372 .991** .9840 .996** 1.00 1.003** 1.009 68
2001 .7985** .1369 .997** .9959 .996** 0.993 .997** .996 68
2002 .7956** .1364 .995* .9920 .994** 0.988 .993* .986 68
2003 .7932** .1360 .996 .9931 .998** .996 .993* .987 68
2004 .7914** .1357 .997 .9950 .997** .996 .995* .990 68
2005 .7883** .1352 .992** 1.0055 .954** .999 .969** .985 68
2006 .7881** .1351 .998** .9967 1.00** 1.010 .994* .988 68
2007 .7940** .1361 1.01 1.0210 1.01 1.016 1.02 1.042 68
2008 .7944** .1362 1.001** 1.0027 .999** 1.00 1.00** 1.00 68
2009 .7963** .1365 1.003* 1.0069 .997** .996 1.01 1.016 68
have an expected growth lower than smaller ones.27
Thus, large and small cities face two different underlying growth pro-
cesses; however, this is still consistent with proposition b) of Subsection
3.1.4 predicting that the associated growth process requires that smaller
cities face a greater volatility of growth than larger cities. For this reason
we now analyse the behaviour of the variance.
The variance ratio for the entire sample in Botswana is greater than
one (θ = 1.078), indicating a greater volatility of the process in 2011. This
27This fact confirms the results in Subsection 3.3.3 in Figure 6: our estimated conditional
mean growth is below zero in the mid-range of cities (city size in logarithmic terms between
6 and 8).
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latter condition is not enough to investigate our statements b) of Subsec-
tion 3.1.4, because it only refers to the temporal non-stability of the vari-
ance, without considering the spatial aspect, namely the (non)independ-
ence of the variance with respect to the size of the cities.28
For this reason, we analyse the two sub-samples separately, as pre-
viously anticipated. The variance, θ, for large cities shows a striking
stability (θ
BIG
= 1), while, for the small cities, it is slightly greater than
one (θ
small
= 1.011), implying an (increasing) change in the underlying
volatility of the growth process for small cities. Given this fact, we can
affirm that at time t (2011), the variance is unchanged for large cities but
increases for the small ones, indicating a dependence of variance with
respect to size; in particular, smaller cities face a greater volatility than
large cities. In summary, statement b) (Subsection 3.1.4), which affirms:
if ρ > 1, in order that Gibrat’s law occurs, it is necessary that the mean
is independent from the city size but not the variance, indeed the asso-
ciate growth process requires that smaller cities face a greater volatility
of growth than larger cities, is satisfied for the whole sample.
3.4.3 Germany
Germany shows an U-shaped ρ-coefficient: it decreases until 1999 and
then it increases. In fact Germany shows a lower degree of agglomera-
tion between 1993 and 1999, namely larger cities become less heavy in the
city system. After 1999, Germany shows again a process of concentration
indicated by the increasing ρ-coefficient. By considering the relationship
with Gibrat’s law, we then investigate condition b) of Subsection 3.1.4.
This case is somewhat different from the previous case for one main rea-
son: the ρ-coefficient also shows a decreasing trend. Considering the
entire sample, we have five years in which Gibrat’s law holds. In partic-
ular, in 1995, 1996, 1999, 2000 and 2003, the estimated β-parameters are
not significantly different from one.
Now if we focus on the period 1993-1999, where a decreasing ρ-coeffic-
28It suggests a change in the variance over the time and then this might also imply
changes in the dependence of the variance over the size.
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ient applies, we can note that βBIG is significantly lower than one, whereas
βsmall is not significantly different from one in most cases, indicating a
situation in which the larger the city, the lower the expected growth. On
the contrary, in the period 2000-2007,29 where an increasing ρ-coefficient
applies, we can notice that βBIG are often not significantly different from
one, while βsmall are (most of the time) significantly greater than one,
indicating a situation in which the larger the city, the larger the expected
growth. In this situation we can figure out the following growth pro-
cesses: when ρ-coefficient is decreasing, we have modifications on the
growth process of large cities; in particular, the larger the city, the lower
the expected growth.
On the other hand, when ρ is increasing, small cities present a dif-
ferent growth process, namely the larger the city, the larger the expected
growth. However, note that both cases should lead to the same effect on
the underlying growth process (i.e. a greater volatility of the variance for
small cities), in order to satisfy condition b). For this reason, we analyze
the variance ratio, θ. By considering the entire sample, the variance ratio,
θ, is often close to unity, but slightly lower than one until 1999 when it
becomes stable (and equal to one). Again, this latter condition says few
things about the independence of the variance from the size. We then an-
alyze the two sub-samples separately and in particular we analyze those
years where Gibrat’s law holds (according to proposition b) of Subsection
3.1.4). Unfortunately, we do not have enough observations to make any
inference about proposition b) in the period 2000-2007 because Gibrats
law holds only in 2003. Focusing on the period 1993-1999, it should be
noted, firstly, that when Gibrat’s law holds, the variance ratios for large
cities, θ
BIG
, are less than one, that is the variance at time t is lower than
that at time t − 1. Instead, the variance ratios for small cities, θ
small
, are
greater than one. At (any) time t, large cities face a lower volatility while
small cities face a greater (or almost stable) volatility. We can then affirm
that, at (any) time t, small cities face a greater volatility of growth. This
29Notice that in the years in which the ρ-coefficient is equal to that of previous year (i.e.
1998, 1999 and 2000), Gibrat’s law holds. The stability of the process should not lead to any
changes in the hierarchical structure of cities.
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is again consistent with proposition b) of Subsection 3.1.4. Again we can
affirm that for those years in which Gibrat’s law holds (β = 1), statement
b) (Subsection 3.1.4), which affirms: “if ρ > 1, in order that Gibrat’s law
occurs, it is necessary that the mean is independent from the city size
but not the variance. In particular the latter should be greater for small
cities”, is satisfied for the whole sample.
3.4.4 Hungary
In Section 3.3, we have shown that Gibrat’s law does not hold in Hun-
gary. We have already mentioned the role of the capital (Budapest) in
this country, which attracts most of the population and most of the in-
vestment on infrastructure. In percentage terms, more than half of the
total population of Hungary lives in the Budapest urban area. More-
over, it faces a migration flow from its rural area to the centre of the city.
The evolution of the ρ-coefficient in this country reflects the tendency
to agglomeration in the large cities: indeed the estimated ρ-coefficient
is increasing and greater than one. In this situation we can check for
statement b) of Subsection 3.1.4. Unfortunately Gibrat’s law never holds,
since the β-coefficients are always significantly greater than one. This
means that size diverges towards its means, namely, the larger a city, the
larger the expected growth. Then it is straightforward that the variance
ratio, θ, increases for both large and small cities. However, it should be
noted that the variance ratio of small cities, θ, is always greater than the
variance ratio of large cities; thus, although we cannot formally show ev-
idence of generalised Gibrat’s law (in particular regarding statement b)),
we again show a greater volatility for small cities when ρ > 1.
The analysis carried out over these three countries provides an im-
portant first conclusion. On the basis of statement b), we have shown
that when ρ > 1 and Gibrat’s law holds (β = 1), the variance ratio (θ-
parameter) is actually greater for small cities. Moreover, when the ρ-
coefficient is greater than one but decreasing, we have modifications on
the growth process of large cities, but not on those of small cities: in par-
ticular, the larger the city, the lower the expected growth. On the other
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hand, when the ρ-coefficient is greater than one, but increasing, small
cities present the opposite growth process: namely the larger the city,
the larger the expected growth. Consequently, we find evidence of the
generalised Gibrat’s law – as in statement b) of Subsection 3.1.4 – in the
countries displaying ρ > 1, where the independence of the mean with
respect to the size is in operation, while the same is not true for the vari-
ance.
A reasonable criticism, at this point in the analysis, could be that gen-
erally, small entities (cities, firms and so on) present a greater volatility
than larger ones. We can anticipate that we will find the opposite evi-
dence in the case of ρ < 1.
We now move to the situation where ρ < 1. By considering the rela-
tionship with Gibrat’s law, we investigate condition c) of Subsection 3.1.4
which predicts that the associate growth process requires that smaller
cities face a lower volatility of growth than larger cities.
3.4.5 Luxembourg
Luxembourg shows an estimated ρ-coefficient lower than one. It in-
creases until 1930, and after that it is not significantly different from one.
Between 1821-1922, we are in condition c) of Subsection 3.1.4. Consider-
ing the entire sample, we have already shown that Gibrat’s law holds in
the first three years of the sample (1851-1880) and in 1922 with estimated
β-parameters not significantly different from one. Moreover, consider-
ing the two sub-samples, most of the time we find evidence of Gibrat’s
law for both large and small cities. At a first glance it seems that large
and small cities face the same underlying growth processes. However,
to test statements c) of Subsection 3.1.4, we need to take into account the
behaviour of the variance.
The variance ratio for the entire sample in Luxembourg in the period
1821-1922 is always greater than one, indicating a greater volatility of
the process as time goes by. Indeed, when we split the sample in two
halves, the variance ratios for the large cities show values always greater
than one, while, for the small cities, they are always below one. This
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implies an (increasing) change in the underlying volatility of the growth
process for large cities, in contrast to a (decreasing) change in the under-
lying volatility of the growth process for small cities. Given this fact, we
can affirm that at time t, the variance is increased for the large cities but
decreased for the small cities, indicating a dependence of variance with
respect to size; in particular, smaller cities face a lower volatility than
large cities. In summary, statement c) (Subsection 3.1.4), which affirms:
“if ρ < 1, In order that Gibrat’s law occurs, it is necessary that the mean
is independent from the city size but not the variance, indeed the asso-
ciate growth process requires that smaller cities face a lower volatility of
growth than larger cities”, is satisfied for the whole sample in 1821-1930.
In the period 1935-2011, however, the ρ-coefficient is not statistically
different from one. By considering the relationship with Gibrat’s law,
we then investigate condition a) of Subsection 3.1.4 which predicts that
the associated growth process requires that smaller cities face the same
growth as larger cities. Considering the entire sample, we have already
shown that Gibrat’s law holds most of the time (estimated β-parameters
not significantly different from one). Considering the two sub-samples,
we find similar evidence for both large and small cities. However it
is interesting to note that in those years where Gibrat’s law does not
hold, the estimated parameters β and θ show very different behaviour
(i.e θ
BIG
=.965 and θ
small
=1.162 in 1970), but, in general, in those years
where Gibrat’s law holds, the differences between the estimators are not
so large (i.e. θ
BIG
=1.00 and θ
small
=1.02 in 2004). In summary, statement
a) (Subsection 3.1.4), which affirms: “if ρ = 1, then in order that Gibrat’s
law occurs neither the mean nor the variance of growth can depend on
size” is satisfied for the whole sample.
3.4.6 Malta
Finally, Malta presents a ρ-coefficient not significantly different from one.
Again, by considering the relationship with Gibrat’s law, we investigate
condition a) of Subsection 3.1.4. Taking into account the entire sample,
Gibrat’s law holds most of the time (estimated β-parameters not signif-
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icantly different from one). Considering the two sub-samples, Gibrat’s
law fails more in the large cities. In these cases, differences between the
estimated parameters β and θ – in the two sub-samples – arise. Clearly,
when Gibrat’s law holds for both sub-samples, no major differences be-
tween the two parameters occur. In summary, statement a) (Subsection
3.1.4) is satisfied.
3.4.7 Synthesis
A synthesis of the above results – confirming the hypotheses by Cor-
doba (2003) – is presented here. The analysis carried out in this section
prompts several interesting conclusions. We have been able to empiri-
cally verify the presence of a “generalized Gibrat’s law”, as theoretically
predicted by Cordoba (2003). In particular, we have verified statements
a), b) and c) of Subsection 3.1.4. In more detail, we have shown that
when ρ > 1 (statement b)) and Gibrat’s law holds (β=1), the variance-
ratio (θ-parameter) is actually higher for the small cities, in comparison
to that for large cities, indicating a larger volatility for small cities. On
the contrary, when ρ < 1 (statement c)) and Gibrat’s law holds (β = 1),
the variance-ratio (θ-parameter) is actually lower for the small cities, in
comparison to that for large cities, indicating a larger volatility for the
smaller ones. When ρ = 1 (statement a)) and Gibrat’s law holds, our
findings agree with previous research, as both the mean and variance
appear to be independent from the size.
Moreover, when the ρ-coefficient is greater than one but decreasing,
we have modifications on the growth process of large cities, but not on
those of small cities; in particular, the larger the city, the lower the ex-
pected growth. On the other hand, when ρ > 1 but increasing, small
cities present the opposite growth process, namely the larger the city, the
larger the expected growth. We have, of course, an opposite behaviour
when the ρ-coefficient is less than one.
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3.5 Conclusion
The aim of our research work was to explore specific conditions lead-
ing to a generalization of Gibrat’s law in connection with the different
typologies of rank-size distribution. For this purpose we empirically ex-
plored the link between the rank-size exponent, ρ, with the necessary
conditions for Gibrat’s law (that is mean and variance of the growth have
to be independent from the size). We started our analysis based on the
conclusion of Cordoba (2003, p. 3): “Pareto distributions with larger ex-
ponents (more unequal distributions) require more volatile growth processes”.
As far as we know, the conventional methodologies (Section 3.3) used
to test Gibrat’s law do not address this issue. In particular, a greater
(lower) volatility of the variance is usually not empirically envisaged.
We showed, instead, that, according to Cordoba (2003), the variance can
be dependent on size if the rank-size coefficient is different from one; in
particular, we verified what Cordoba (2003) calls a “generalized Gibrat’s
law” for different countries with different spatial-economic characteris-
tics: Botswana, Germany, Hungary, Luxembourg and Malta. We found
strong evidence of this generalized Gibrat’s law for Botswana, Luxem-
bourg and Malta. We found weak evidence of Gibrat’s law for Germany
and no evidence for Hungary.
Our results confirm the propositions provided by Cordoba (2003). In
particular, when ρ=1, neither the mean nor the variance of growth de-
pend on size; when ρ > 1, the mean is independent of the city size, but
not the variance, and small cities face a greater volatility in growth than
larger cities; alternatively, when ρ < 1, the mean is independent from the
city size, but not the variance, and large cities face a greater volatility in
growth than smaller ones. Gibrat and Zipf have offered complementary
perspectives on city size and systems of cites in a given country. Their
contributions are not necessarily identical, but offer new perspectives on
the same multi-faceted prism of the space-economy. These laws are part
of the same family, but also reveal specific distinct features. In particular,
we find that Zipf’s law and the rank-size rule behave like “monozygotic”
twins, while Gibrat’s law seems to show the behavious of a “heterozy-
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gotic” twin. These results might be useful to “relax” Gibrat’s law in its
strict interpretation, by reinforcing the hypothesis that small entities face
a greater volatility in the growth process.
Our analysis prompts various intriguing research questions in the
future. While Gibrat’s law and Zipf’s law mirror important organised
structures in the topology of systems of cities, other relevant structural
patterns may be investigated as well, such as the existence of fractal
structures in urban systems (based, for example, on Mandelbrot’s princi-
ples) or the persistent existence of spatial population or socio-economic
disparities (based, for example, on Herfindahl’s index). Clearly, the dy-
namics of such processes deserve due attention. In addition, the above
applied investigation also calls for more fundamental research into the
functional or behavioural backgrounds of such regularities. Three re-
search directions are important here; (a) the interdependence between
population indicators and broader socio-economic indicators for a sys-
tem of cities; (b) the degree of various cities in the same national system;
(c) the relationship between recent strong evolutionary trends in the dig-
ital world and the development of cities (and systems of cities).
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Chapter 4
Does the EU have a
homogeneous urban
structure area? The role of
agglomeration and the
impact of (hypothetical)
shocks on the EU urban
structure
4.1 Introduction
“ Cities and metropolitan areas are the engines of economic development. They
are also at the frontline when it comes to tackling obstacles to growth and em-
ployment, such as social exclusion and environmental degradation ” European
Commission (2010, p. 3).
The effort of the European Union in (sustainably) developing urban
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areas has been, at least by the late 1980s and early 1990s,1 high by means
of a range of policies over many areas of activity (Backer et al., 1997).
Currently, indeed, the EU aims to reduce regional disparities through
the so called Regional Policy. In particular, the EU has two funds for this
purpose: the Structural Funds and the Cohesion Funds, that play a key
role in the reduction of regional disparities in terms of income, wealth
and opportunities and in the development of Europe’s towns and cities.
However, in spite of the effort of the EU in the reduction of regional
disparities, “no single blueprint of sustainability will be found, as economic
and social systems and ecological conditions differ widely among countries”,
(World Commission on Environment and Development, 1987, p. 52).
Furthermore, as noted by Aldskogius (2000), the urban structures be-
tween the Member States of the European Union is very different for
several reasons, from historical ones to the administrative subdivision
through the economic structure of the Member States. Table 10 shows
selected characteristics of the Member States in 2011 and gives an in-
teresting picture of the differences between countries in term of urban
structure.
Total population and land size vary consistently among countries
within the EU, however Member States show big differences also in term
of population density, percentage of rural population, people who live
in the largest city and also in other variables as agricultural land, road
density and rail density.
It is interesting to notice that different countries show different pat-
terns in terms of urban structure. For instance Belgium has a population
density of 364 people per sq. km and it also shows a low percentage of
rural population (2.5 over the entire population) but it presents an agri-
cultural land equal to the 45% of the entire surface. On the contrary, the
Netherlands, a country with almost same land size as Belgium, shows a
higher population density than Belgium but also a higher rural popula-
tion and a higher percentage of agricultural land, indicating a different
1At least from the publication of the Brundtland Report from the United Nations World
Commission on Environment and Development (WCED) in 1987 which provided an analy-
sis for a sustainable course of development within societies and suggested broad remedies
and recommendations.
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allocation of people between urban and rural areas. This fact is also un-
derlined by the amount of population living in the largest city: 18% for
Belgium (Anvers) and 7.7 % for the Netherlands (Amsterdam). Germany
and Italy, instead, although presenting differences in size in terms both
of population and land size, show similar urban patterns characterized
by (among others characteristics) a low percentage of population in the
largest city. This fact could be due to historical reasons, indeed since a
long time both Germany and Italy have been politically fragmented. The
competition between numerous states was high and led to the creation
of several market centers and capitals, large and small. As a result of this
process, the two countries present a large numbers of towns and cities
where - especially in Italy - the memory of city-state remains alive (Le
Gales, 2002). Instead, Spain, that is a country of size similar to Germany
and Italy, shows a slightly different pattern: the population density, 93,
and the rural population, 22.6, are lower than in those countries. The
population living in the largest city, instead, is relatively higher. Finally,
it should be noticed that the transition countries show a higher rural
population than those ones denoting a higher level of economic devel-
opment.
This first rough picture of the differences of urban structures among
countries might denote different underlying economic forces of EU’s Mem-
ber States. For instance, the degree of urbanization is strictly related
to differences in regional per capita income (Mera, 1975); odds in the
population density can lead to different conditions in the labor market
(Armington and Acs, 2002) and/or investments in infrastructure (Fay
and Yepes, 2003; Randolph, Bogetic and Hefley, 1999) and so on. On this
regards, the countries of Benelux (Belgium, the Netherlands and Lux-
embourg) present population densities that are the highest among EU
countries and, related to that, they all show a high density level both in
terms of road and rail networks. On the contrary, Bulgaria, Finland and
Romania, countries with a population density lower than 100 people per
km2 present a low road and rail density.
On the other way round, the impact of a given policy can lead to
a change in the urban structure. For instance, Yang (1999) shows that,
70
Ta
bl
e
10
:S
pa
ti
al
Ec
on
om
ic
s
C
ha
ra
ct
er
is
ti
cs
of
th
e
27
EU
M
em
be
r
St
at
es
in
20
09
C
ou
nt
ry
Po
pu
la
ti
on
La
nd
Po
pu
la
ti
on
R
ur
al
Po
pu
la
ti
on
in
A
gr
ic
ul
tu
ra
l
R
oa
d
D
en
si
ty
R
ai
lD
en
si
ty
(t
ho
us
an
ds
)
(k
m
2
)
D
en
si
ty
Po
pu
la
ti
on
in
th
e
la
rg
es
tc
it
y
la
nd
(%
of
to
t)
(l
en
gt
h
∗1
0
0
0
(l
en
gt
h
∗1
0
0
0
(p
eo
pl
e
∗k
m
2
)
(%
to
t.
ur
ba
n)
k
m
2
)
k
m
2
)
A
us
tr
ia
8,
41
9
82
,4
30
10
2
32
.3
30
.0
38
.4
1,
27
8.
9
76
.3
Be
lg
iu
m
11
,0
08
30
,2
80
36
4
2.
5
18
.0
45
.0
4,
98
7.
4
10
5.
9
Bu
lg
ar
ia
7,
47
6
10
8,
56
0
69
26
.9
22
.0
46
.3
36
2.
5
37
.3
C
yp
ru
s
1,
11
7
9,
24
0
12
1
29
.5
31
.4
13
.5
1,
58
6.
1
0
C
ze
ch
R
ep
ub
lic
10
,5
46
77
,2
50
13
7
26
.6
15
.1
54
.9
1,
61
9.
4
12
2.
1
D
en
m
ar
k
5,
57
4
42
,4
30
13
1
13
.1
24
.4
62
.1
1,
69
8.
7
61
.9
Es
to
ni
a
1,
34
0
42
,3
90
32
30
.5
42
.8
22
.0
1,
28
3.
1
26
.4
Fi
nl
an
d
5,
38
7
30
3,
90
0
18
16
.3
32
.6
7.
6
23
0.
9
17
.5
Fr
an
ce
65
,4
37
54
7,
66
0
11
9
14
.3
20
.7
53
.4
1,
87
0.
4
54
.5
G
er
m
an
y
81
,7
26
34
8,
61
0
23
4
26
.1
5.
7
48
.4
1,
80
5.
2
11
7.
6
G
re
ec
e
11
,3
04
12
8,
90
0
88
38
.5
47
.1
63
.6
89
0.
7
19
.5
H
un
ga
ry
9,
97
1
90
,5
30
11
0
30
.6
25
.0
63
.9
2,
12
3.
2
99
.0
Ir
el
an
d
4,
48
7
68
,8
90
65
37
.8
39
.5
60
.8
1,
36
6.
6
46
.1
It
al
y
60
,7
70
29
4,
14
0
20
7
31
.6
8.
2
47
.3
1,
61
8.
4
67
.2
La
tv
ia
2,
22
0
62
,1
80
36
32
.3
46
.2
29
.5
1,
13
1.
4
34
.7
Li
th
ua
ni
a
3,
20
3
62
,6
70
51
32
.9
24
.4
42
.9
1,
24
0.
9
27
.1
Lu
xe
m
bo
ur
g
51
7
2,
59
0
20
0
14
.6
21
.9
50
.6
2,
01
8.
2
10
6.
2
M
al
ta
41
9
32
0
13
09
5.
2
50
.9
28
.1
69
6
0
N
et
he
rl
an
ds
16
,6
96
33
,7
30
49
5
16
.9
7.
7
56
.8
3,
29
4.
7
69
.7
Po
la
nd
38
,2
16
30
4,
20
0
12
6
39
.1
7.
3
53
.0
1,
35
6.
0
62
.1
Po
rt
ug
al
10
,6
37
91
,4
70
11
6
39
.0
44
.0
40
.3
89
9.
9
36
.0
R
om
an
ia
21
,3
90
23
0,
06
0
93
47
.2
16
.5
58
.8
34
2.
8
45
.2
Sl
ov
ak
R
ep
ub
lic
5,
44
0
48
,0
90
11
3
45
.2
14
.1
40
.1
89
2.
5
73
.9
Sl
ov
en
ia
2,
05
2
20
,1
40
10
2
50
.1
26
.4
23
.2
1,
92
0.
3
60
.6
Sp
ai
n
46
,2
35
49
8,
80
0
93
22
.6
16
.2
55
.5
1,
34
8.
1
30
.3
Sw
ed
en
9,
45
3
41
0,
34
0
23
14
.8
16
.3
7.
5
1,
27
2.
2
25
.8
U
ni
te
d
K
in
gd
om
62
,6
41
24
1,
93
0
25
9
20
.4
15
.5
71
.6
1,
61
9.
1
67
.6
Eu
ro
A
re
a
33
2,
99
0
2,
55
1,
58
0
13
1
24
.5
15
.4
45
.5
1,
44
5.
1
54
.1
Eu
ro
pe
an
U
ni
on
50
3,
68
0
4,
18
1,
73
0
12
0
26
.0
15
.6
45
.1
1,
35
5.
7
53
.4
71
among the others, urban policies, investments in the urban sector, insti-
tutions and financial policies are responsible for the long-term income
differential between urban and rural areas. Moreover, urban places ex-
pand their influence on a much larger hinterland than rural areas and the
difference between urban and rural places goes behind the simple differ-
ence in population size, but also in a different concentration of economic
activities, people and cultures. (Pacione, 2001).
These facts also have an impact on the definition of agglomeration:
how many inhabitants are necessary before a given agglomeration can be
defined as “urban”? Across countries this definition varies substantially
and also within the same countries this definition can change from time
to time (United Nations, 1974). Moreover as reported in Manual VIII
(United Nations, 1974) it is very difficult if not impossible to prescribe a
uniform limit for all countries because qualitative characteristics or even
residential densities in settlements of a given size can vary significantly
among the countries.
However, European countries are trying to adopt a ’common’ defi-
nition by which units with 10,000 or more inhabitants are considered as
urban, those with 2,000-9,999 inhabitants as semi-urban, and those with
less than 2,000 as rural. Despite this definition, still a considerable num-
ber of Member States use different thresholds and/or rules aiming to
discriminate what is rural and what is urban. As an example, Table 6 of
the Demographic Yearbook 2009-2010 of the United Nations reports the
definition of “urban” across countries over the world. It can be noticed
that between EU Member States the definition of urban is not homoge-
nous, i.e. Austria defines urban areas all the localities with a population
above 2,000; France adopts a population threshold of 10,000 and Bulgaria
gives just a legal definition of what might be considered urban (United
Nations, 2009, Table 6).
Then, the European Union is still a multifaceted entity, at least in
terms of urban structure, where the harmonization between countries
is still going on and, given those stylized facts, we can ask whether the
deeper and deeper integration of European Union affected the hierarchi-
cal structure of the city system of the Member States and, furthermore, if
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the European Union is an area where urban and regional policies affect
Member States in the same way or, on the contrary, if it is still a hetero-
geneous entity and a heterogeneous area in recovering from exogenous
shocks.
The study of the hierarchical structure is important for several rea-
sons, first of all because the population is spread across geographic areas
in a way that, although continuously changing, is not possible to define
as random. Indeed, countries have faced a strong tendency toward ag-
glomeration, namely population gathers within proper areas like cities,
and currently the agglomeration within cities “is an extremely complex
amalgam of incentives and actions taken by millions of individuals, businesses,
and organizations” Eeckhout (2004, p. 1429). Moreover we can affirm that
the principal determinants of the dynamics of city populations are eco-
nomic and institutional factors.
Then the creation of the European Union, the distortions caused by
the introduction of a single currency in countries structurally very dif-
ferent and the expansion of mobility of people, capital and services due
to the constitution of the so-called Schengen Area from the beginning of
’90s, with the intent to build a common/integrated area, might have had
some impacts on the dynamics of city populations.
In this chapter we use an alternative approach to examine whether, i)
the EU affects the city system of the Member States and ii) EU city system
can be seen as an integrated area. Specifically, we use, in an alternative
way, two very well known empirical regularities, Zipf’s law (Auerback,
1915; Zipf, 1949) and Gibrat’s law (Gibrat, 1931). Alternative means that
aim of this chapter is not to verify if the former laws hold but it means
that we use them as a tools to explore the research questions i) and ii).
Zipf’s law predicts the degree of hierarchization of a system of cities
and it can be seen as an indicator of the strength of the agglomeration
forces in a system of cities (Singer, 1930; Brakman et al., 2001). Gibrat’s
Law suggests that the growth of a city is independent of size, a condi-
tion that would hold if temporary shock has a permanent impact on the
pattern of growth of the cities (Brakman et al., 2004). The present chapter
then, takes the moves from the huge literature on Zipf’s and Gibrat’s law.
73
In particular, this work has its roots on the research of Rosen and Resnick
(1989) and Soo (2005) for the part related to Zipf’s law and on the works
of Gabaix (1999), Brakman et al. (2004) and Giesen and Suedekum (2012)
for the part related to Gibrat’s law.
Rosen and Resnick (1989) provide an international analysis of Zipf’s
law over 44 countries. They found the validity of Zipf’s law in most of
the cases and moreover they provide empirical evidence that the Zipf
exponent is positively influenced by per capita GNP, total population
and railroad density, and negatively related to land area.2 Soo (2005)
updates these results but concludes for a rejection of Zipf’s Law in more
than half of cases. Moreover he found that political variables matter more
than economic variables in determining the size distribution of cities. In
details the total government expenditure and war dummy enter with a
very strong positive coefficient. Instead, among economic variables, the
degree of scale economies seems to significantly and positively influence
the Zipf coefficient, whereas trade as a percentage of GDP weakly and
negatively influence it.
Gabaix (1999) and Giesen and Suedekum (2011) address the same
issue, i.e. if urban growth in all regions follows Gibrat’s law, then we
should observe the Zipfian rank-size rule among large cities both at the
regional and national level. Gabaix (1999) provides theoretical rationale
while Giesen and Suedekum (2011) provide empirical evidence. Finally,
Brakman et al. (2004) analyze whether war shock has an impact on post-
war German city growth finding that war shock has only a temporary
impact on it since German city growth faces a tendency toward mean
reversion.
The present chapter, then, sets out to do three things: the first is to
provide an accurate description of agglomeration. This involves a static
analysis, supported by Zipf’s law, accounting for the way the population
is gathered over different geographic locations. The second is to provide
an accurate description of population mobility. This involves a dynamic
2Positively means that greater per capita GNP, total population and railroad density are
associated with a more even distribution of cities. Instead, negatively means that greater
land area is associated with a more agglomerated distribution of cities.
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analysis, supported by Gibrat’s law, accounting for the evolution over
time of the distribution of the population over different locations. Here
we are able to determine if EU city system can be seen as an integrated
area and, in particular, if temporary shock has a permanent impact on the
pattern of city growth. Finally, once population mobility is understood,
we explore the impact of the underlying economic mechanism and of the
constitution of the EU, the Euro and the Schengen Area on agglomeration
forces.
We find that, generally, the hierarchical structures of Member States
of EU is more even than expected. Moreover, EU city system is still far
from being an integrated area and in particular, we find that the Eu-
ropean Union seems to be split in three distinct areas: an integrated
area characterized by the validity of Gibrat’s law where large tempor-
ary shocks might have permanent impacts on the city structure; another
area that is characterized by the presence of mean reversion and where
any exogenous shock is used up in certain amount of time and, finally, a
small area where the effects of the shocks is magnified in the big cities.
Finally, we find that only the constitution of the Schengen Area and the
share of international trade seem to have a weak impact on the hierarchi-
cal structures of Member States presenting respectively a positive impact
on the Zipf coefficient (more even distribution) and a negative impact
(more agglomerated distribution) and then indicating two sources, one
against and one in favor, of agglomeration forces. Those results are in
line with previous findings of Soo (2005) and Alperovich (1993).
The next section outlines Zipf’s law and Gibrat’s law. Section 4.3 de-
scribes the data and Section 4.4 presents the results. Then Section 4.5
concludes.
4.2 Zipf’s law, Gibrat’s law: definitions, method-
ologies and economic interpretations
The Member States of the EU have a long history of conflict. Only in the
last century Europe has been the main theater of the two World Wars.
However, after WWII, European Countries started an integration project
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that led to the creation of European Union that, in some way, covered up
old tensions (Nahoi, 2011). The creation of the European Union with free
movement of goods, services people and capital might have changed the
population distribution across geographic areas. Nevertheless, as men-
tioned before, people tend to concentrate within common restricted areas
like cities in a way that is not random (Eeckhout, 2004).
On this regard, Brakman, Garretsen and van Marrewijk (2001) af-
firm that a simple and plausible way to explain birth and growth of
cities should be definitively linked to the existence of agglomeration and
congestion forces. More specifically, following Kooij (1988), urbaniza-
tion follows three distinct periods: Pre-industrialization, characterized
by high transport cost that discourages agglomeration; Industrialization,
where transportation cost starts to decrease and the importance of in-
dustrial plants becomes higher since an increases of return to scale; Post-
industrialization, where congestion and declining importance of indus-
trial production become established. Zipf’s law, although it does not di-
rectly address the characterization presented by Kooij, is often described
in term of tension between congestion and agglomeration forces, (see
Sutton, 1997; Gabaix and Ioannides, 2004 for a survey) and it provides a
proxy for urbanization.
In more detail, Zipf’s law is an empirical regularity stating the pro-
portionality of the cities to their rank. This means that for example, in
Italy, the size of Rome (the largest city in Italy) is roughly twice the size
of Milan, the second largest city, three times the third largest city, Naples,
and so on. Formally, this can be written as:
Ri = KP
−q
i , (4.1)
Equation 4.1 is known as the rank-size rule and is usually expressed
in logarithmic form, as follows:
ln(Ri) = k − q lnPi, (4.2)
where Ri is the rank of the cities assigned as 1 to the largest city, 2 the
second largest city and N the smallest one, k is a (ln) constant, Pi is the
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population size and q is the parameter of interest, the so-called rank-size
coefficient that here will be used as a proxy for agglomeration forces.3
Several interpretations of the rank-size coefficient, q, have been given
in the literature. The reader can consult Modica, Reggiani and Nijkamp
(2013) for a brief summary. In this chapter we interpret the q-coefficient
in the simplest way, that is as an indicator of the strength of the agglom-
eration forces in a system of cities (Singer, 1930; Brakman et al., 2001).
On this vein, the rank-size coefficient might be considered an index of
metropolization, in the sense that the lower the q-coefficient, the more
important is the urban land value. In fact the q-coefficient measures how
(un)even the city system is, namely this means that the higher the q-
coefficient, the more equally distributed the city system (in the extreme,
when q=∞, the system of cities is very even: all cities of the same size;
when q=0, instead, the system will be composed just by one city hosting
the entire population).
In the above interpretation (i.e. the tension between agglomeration
and congestion) of Zipf’s law the size of cities matters, however, there
is another way to explain Zipf’s law in which the (relative) size of cities
does not matter, this is the case of the use of Gibrat’s law in explaining
Zipf’s law (Gabaix, 1999).
Gibrat’s law is a rule stating that the (relative) growth of a given en-
tity (city, firm, income and so on) does not depend on its size.4 This
means that, albeit an entity can grow at different rates, it can’t be found
any systematic behavior between their growth and their size. Then, ac-
cording to Gibrat (1931), we cannot affirm that larger entities grow faster
than smaller ones or vice versa. Analytically, following Steindl (1968):
logP (t) = logP (0) + ε(1) + ε(2) + . . .+ ε(T ), (4.3)
3Notice that we estimate the rank-size coefficient using simple rank-size OLS regres-
sions where, following Gabaix and Ibragimov (2011), the rank is shifted by 0.5 to correct
for the potential bias in small samples highlighted by Gabaix and Ioannides (2004), so that
the estimating equation is ln(Ri − 0.5) = k − q lnP .
4The reader can consult Modica et al. (2013) for a deep discussion on Gibrat’s law and
its relationship with Zipf’s law.
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where, P (t) is the size of a certain entity at time t,P (0) is the initial
size, and ε(t) is a random variable (indicating random shocks). Equation
4.3 defines the logarithm of the size of a given entity as the sum of the
initial size and past growth rates. Moreover as Gabaix (1999) notices,
Gibrat’s law implies that the growth process of a given entity presents
a common mean and a common variance, or, in other terms, mean and
variance of the growth have to be independent from the size of the entity.
Several authors have proposed economic interpretations of Gibrat’s
law that differ only in some shades. For instance, Black and Henderson
(2003), state that a shock affects in the same way big and small entities
whereas, Brakman, Garretsen and Schramm (2004), state that a large tem-
porary shock can have a permanent impact. This means that a shock can
change the growth path toward another size equilibrium. In this work,
we adhere to the latter interpretation and then we will use Gibrat’s law
to test whether a (hypothetical) shock (will) influence the Member States
of EU in the same way or, on the contrary, if it (will) has heterogeneous
effects.
Several methodologies have been proposed to test Gibrat’s law. How-
ever, it is commonly tested looking at the non-stationarity of the growth
series. The rationale underlying this test is the following: if the series is
stationary it will converge toward a constant mean and, therefore, large
values (big entities) will be followed at any further periods by smaller
and smaller values, while small values (small entities) will be followed
by larger and larger ones. In this way, the level of the series at any pe-
riods can significantly predict the one of the next period and then the
growth of the entities are not independent on the initial state. On the
other hand, if the series is integrated, then large values and small values
will occur with probabilities that do not depend on the current size of the
entities and then the growth of the entities are independent on the initial
state.
Finally, it has to be noticed that the studies on Zipf’s and Gibrat’s law
usually consider only the upper tail of the data, i.e. the largest cities,
with a sample truncation point that is usually arbitrarily chosen. Here to
avoid any sources of arbitrariness we use a method proposed by Clauset
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et al. (2009) and it will be deep presented in the next section. 5
To sum, Zipf’s law shows the static relationship of the size of a certain
entity with its rank. Gibrat’s law, instead, presents the dynamic growth
process of this entity. We will use both the laws to show how the EU
tends toward agglomeration and if it can be seen as a homogeneous area,
but first we will introduce the data in the next section.
4.3 The data
In this chapter, we collect city population data from the National Statis-
tics Office of the Member States. The time windows vary according to
the availability of the data from any Statistical Office, however when we
present the cross-countries analysis we adopt a unique time span namely
from 1991 to 2011. This is due because of two main reasons. First of all,
the time period of interest for this work is the one covering the period of
greater strength of integration among Member States, i.e. between 1991
and 2011. Second, that’s the only time span that has observations for all
the 27 Member States.
One main concern is that the method used to define the borders of
the statistical units can change dramatically and, often, the definition
of cities changes in relation to the official definition of city boundaries
given by the statistical authorities (Soo, 2005). As an example the UK ad-
ministrative geography is organized as follows: Country -> Region − >
County/Unitary Authority − > Local Authority − > Ward and - some
case Parish (mainly rural areas). Italy, instead, is based on a legal ad-
ministrative division still strictly related to historical subdivision in State
− > Region − > Province − > Municipality. It should be noticed that
UK Local Authority is something slightly different from an Italian Mu-
nicipality, since the latter, typically, do not include surrounding suburbs,
i.e. the places where the workers of a city reside are considered as other
municipalities.
Moreover, the debate on the unit of observations is still alive. Since
5For a thorough analysis of this issue the reader can consult Gabaix (1999), Fazio and
Modica (2012) and Ioannides and Skouras (2013).
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a long time, it has been noticed that defining the unit of study as urban
places, legal cities or urban agglomeration may affect the estimates of
the rank-size coefficient (Rosen and Resnick ,1980; Cheshire, 1999). On
this regard, the literature proposed several solutions: metropolitan ar-
eas (among the others Ioannides and Overman, 2003; Dobkins and Ioan-
nides, 2000); economic areas (Berry and Okulicz-Kozaryn, 2012); clus-
tered populated areas (Rozenfeld, Rybski, Gabaix, and Makse, 2011) and,
finally, natural cities (Jing and Jia, 2010).
Due to the availability of data, to overcome this issue, we choose the
most homogenous unit of observations among Member States we have
found, namely “locality” that is the smallest administrative level of ag-
gregation available for any country. 6
Another main concern related to the data, already mentioned in the
previous section, is the choice of the appropriate truncation point for the
upper tail. The methods generally adopted on this regards are three:
the choice of a fixed number of cities between countries (i.e. the 100
larger cities); the choice of a fixed population threshold (i.e. all the cities
with a population above 100,000); all the cities for which the sum of the
population accounts for some given proportion of a country’s population
(i.e. all the largest cities for which the sum of the population accounts the
10% of the country’s population), Cheshire (1999).
However, all these proposed methodologies discount a certain amount
of arbitrariness (Fazio and Modica 2012; Ioannides and Skouras, 2013). In
order to avoid this arbitrariness, we exploit an alternative non-parametric
methodology to estimate the appropriate minimum threshold, firstly pro-
posed by Clauset et al. (2009).
The rationale behind this methodology lies on the idea that Zipf’s
Law should led to a Pareto distribution with a shape parameter (that is
our q) equal to 1 (Eeckhout, 2004). Then, Clauset et al. (2009) propose to
test the equality between the theoretical and empirical density functions
6It should be noted that EUROSTAT provides “Nomenclature of territorial units for
statistics” (hereinafter referred to as NUTS). Although it might be an alternative and per-
haps better measure of agglomeration, it is still based on administrative units within the
Member States, where the only discriminant is based on the population size, i.e. NUTS3
has a minimum of 150,000 and a maximum of 800,000 inhabitants.
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using a Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests over recursively truncated distribu-
tions and choosing the sample showing the best fit to a Pareto distribu-
tion (the minimum of the statistics D below), indicating the sample of
cities where agglomeration forces are stronger (Fazio and Modica, 2012).
In sum, our estimate population threshold, Pˆ , is the value of popula-
tion, P , that minimizes the Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistics, D:
D = sup
p>p
|Φp(x)− Φ(x)|, (4.4)
where Φp(x) is the empirical cumulative density function for any city
of population p above p, and Φ(x) is the theoretical cumulative density
function of the Pareto distribution. The KS statistic just computes the
supremum of the absolute value of the distances between the two. Under
the null, the distance between the two is zero and then the sample is
drawn from the reference distribution, that in our case is a Pareto.
In this way we are able to collect a unique data-set avoiding some of
the common issues, namely we identify an upper-tail strictly related to
the agglomeration characteristics of the Member States allowing homo-
geneity in the data. Table 11 summarizes the main characteristics of the
data-set.
Data for the second stage regression, which seeks to find the impact
of the constitution of the European Union on the city hierarchical struc-
tures, are obtained from the World Bank World Development Indicators,
the UNIDO Industrial Statistics Database and EUROSTAT. In more de-
tails, the variable road density is constructed using EUROSTAT data on
the length of the roads. GDP per capita in constant US dollars, total land,
total population, trade as a percentage of GDP, and number of internet
users are from the World Bank World Development Indicators. The data
for public expenditure are those from the World Bank World Develop-
ment Indicators with the exception of year 2011 (still not available) and
then they are retrieved from the original source, namely the single na-
tional statistical offices. Scale economies are constructed starting from
information presented in the UNIDO Industrial Statistics Database.
More details on the data used in the second stage regressions will be
presented in the next section as well as the results.
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Table 11: Description of the data and estimated threshold of the 27 EU
Member States
Country Population N. of Localities
Average
Threshold Population Size
(thousands)
population per
truncationlocality
Austria 8,431 2,357 3,577.00 654 2,497
Belgium 10,928 589 18,553.48 184 17,691
Bulgaria 7,327 5,059 1,448.31 1,405 571
Cyprus 839 388 2,162.37 67 1,966
Czech Republic 10,335 6,216 1,662.64 1,891 728
Denmark 4,832 1,469 3,289.31 392 1,528
Estonia 1,324 226 5,858.41 187 962
Finland 5,375 336 15,997.02 81 14,067
France 64,304 36,674 1,753.39 3,377 3,052
Germany 81,752 11,421 7,158.04 838 17,164
Greece 10,934 1,034 10,574.49 492 4,638
Hungary 9,986 3,153 3,167.14 1,012 1,526
Ireland 2,318 858 2,701.63 293 945
Italy 59,571 8,092 7,361.72 1,170 10,300
Latvia 2,261 523 4,323.14 372 853
Lithuania 2,171 102 21,284.31 30 11,623
Luxembourg 512 115 4,452.17 90 1242
Malta 412 67 6,149.25 13 10,770
Netherlands 14,432 2,025 7,126.91 175 14,885
Poland 38,200 2,478 15,415.66 1,099 8,293
Portugal 10,132 3,867 2,620.12 1,196 1,485
Romania 19,600 3,182 6,159.65 1,659 2,979
Slovak Republic 5,435 2,888 1,881.93 1,051 938
Slovenia 1,915 3,074 622.97 1,496 222
Spain 47,190 8,115 5,815.16 513 15,851
Sweden 8,003 1,912 4,185.67 249 4,518
United Kingdom 52,518 3,121 16,827.30 206 46,357
4.4 Results
In this section we present the results. First we provide an accurate de-
scription of agglomeration. This involves a static analysis, supported
by Zipf’s law, accounting for the way the population is gathered over
different geographic locations. Second, we move on the analysis of the
homogenous/heterogeneous areas within the EU and we provide the dy-
namic part of the story. This second part provides the dynamic analysis,
supported by Gibrat’s law, accounting for the evolution over time of the
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distribution of the population over different locations. Here we are able
to determine if EU city system can be seen as an integrated area and
in particular if a temporary shock has a permanent impact on the pat-
tern of city growths. Finally, once population mobility is understood, we
explore the impact of the underlying economic mechanism and of the
constitution of the EU, the Euro and the Schengen Area on the agglom-
eration forces.
4.4.1 Hierarchical structure and its determinants
In this section, we discuss the results from the following equation (rank-
size rule with a Gabaix and Ibragimov, 2011 modification):
ln(Ri − 0.5) = k − q lnP, (4.5)
where k is a constant and P is the population size. Standard errors
are given by (2/n)0.5 qˆ. The parameter qˆ is the rank-size coefficient that
will be used in the second step. Table 12 and Table 13 present the detailed
results of the OLS regressions of Eq. 4.5. We show just the first and the
latter results for any Member States, however full details are available
from the author upon request.
The rank-size coefficient, q, is an index of metropolization, in the
sense that the lower the q-coefficient, the more important the urban land
value. In fact the q-coefficient measures how (un)even the city system is,
namely this means that the higher the q-coefficient, the more equally dis-
tributed the city system (in the extreme, when q=∞, the system of cities
is very even, all cities have the same size; when q=0, instead, the system
will be composed just by one city hosting the entire population. Finally,
when q=1 the city system is said to obey Zipf’s law).
The largest value of the rank-size coefficient in 2011 (4.049) is ob-
tained for Malta, followed by Belgium (1.724) results in line with those
found by Soo (2005), whereas the lowest value is obtained for Denmark
(0.949).
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Table 12: Rank-size coefficients and city thresholds of the 27 EU Member
States (first and last observation available)
Country Period
Rank-size
Upper Tail
Rank-size
Upper Tailcoefficient (first coefficient (last
year available year available
Austria 1981-2011
1.469
1036
1.440
654
(0.0645) (0.0796)
Belgium 1990-2011
1.691
195
1.724
184
(0.1713) (0.1798)
Bulgaria 1985-2011
1.114
1686
1.021**
1405
(0.0383) (0.0385)
Cyprus 2001-2011
0.773
209
0.994**
69
(0.0756) (0.1717)
Czech Republic 1996-2011
1.014**
2025
1.066**
1891
(0.0318) (0.0347)
Denmark 1976-2011
0.876
1078
0.949**
392
(0.0377) (0.0676)
Estonia 2001-2011
1.096**
184
1.141**
70
(0.1142) (0.1929)
Finland 1990-2010
1.226**
158
1.250**
81
(0.1380) (0.1977)
France 1975-2009
1.039**
7167
1.200
3337
(0.0174) (0.0292)
Germany 1991-2011
1.284
859
1.322
838
(0.0619) (0.0646)
Greece 1991-2001
1.182
544
1.164
492
(0.0061) (0.0077)
Hungary 1980-2011
1.137
1075
1.110*
1012
(0.0490) (0.0493)
Ireland 1991-2011
0.787
602
0.987**
293
(0.0453) (0.0815)
Italy 1991-2011
1.300
1563
1.400
1170
(0.0465) (0.0579)
Latvia 2001-2009
1.159*
415
1.079**
372
(0.0805) (0.0791)
Lithuania 1989-2011
0.904**
26
0.948**
30
(0.2506) (0.2449)
Luxembourg 1821-2011
2.139
49
1.197**
90
(0.4322) (0.1784)
Malta 1901-2011
1.084**
41
4.049
13
(0.2395) (0.2597)
Netherlands 2001 - -
1.199**
175
(0.1282)
Poland 1988-2010
1.351
1553
1.365
1099
(0.0485) (0.0582)
Portugal 2001-2011
1.159
1239
1.115*
1196
(0.0466) (0.0456)
Romania 2011 - -
1.402
1659
(0.0487)
* Significant at 1% ** significant at 5%; for rank-size coefficient significantly not different from 1
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Table 13: (...continued) Rank-size coefficients and city thresholds of the 27
EU Member States (first and last observation available)
Country Period
Rank-size
Upper Tail
Rank-size
Upper Tailcoefficient (first coefficient (last
year available year available
Slovakia 1991-2010
1.135
1130
1.169
938
(0.0478) (0.0510)
Slovenia 2001-2011
1.203
1639
1.204
1496
(0.0420) (0.0440)
Spain 1991-2011
1.110**
651
1.198
513
(0.0615) (0.0748)
Sweden 1990-2010
1.136**
245
1.085**
249
(0.1026) (0.0972)
United Kingdom 1991-2001
1.459
159
1.467
206
(0.1636) (0.1445)
Euro Area 2001 - -
1.377
2660
(0.00528)
European Union (excluded Romania) 2001 - -
1.401
1419
(0.0526)
* Significant at 1% ** significant at 5%; for rank-size coefficient significantly not different from 1
In more details, the rank-size coefficient, q, is significantly greater
than 1 for 13 of our 27 countries, while a further 14 observations are sig-
nificantly not different from 1. These results indicate a situation where
the half (in general small countries, both in terms of economic and demo-
graphic characteristics) of the EU Member States presents a hierarchical
structure strictly following a Zipf’s distribution (i.e. the largest city is
double of the second largest city, three times of the third and so on) and
the other halve presents a more even distribution. Indeed, this means
that for 13 countries agglomeration forces are stronger than the other 14
Member States (or on the same way, congestion forces are stronger in the
other 14 countries), indicating a straight hierarchy. Notice that there is
no cases where the rank-size coefficient is lower than 1.
These results are stronger than those found by Soo (2005) who presents
17 Member States with a coefficient significantly greater than 1 and two
Member States with a coefficient not different from 1.7 The differences in
the results, in our opinion, come from two sources: first of all, the data-set
7In Soo (2005) Cyprus, Estonia, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Slovenia
are not in the international analysis.
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in the present chapter is shaped to take directly in consideration agglom-
eration forces using the Clauset et al. (2009) method. This method is able
to recognize the cut-off where agglomeration forces are stronger and this
can lead to an increase of the cases where the Zipf’s law strictly holds.
Secondly, we use a modified rank-size rule that solves the problem of the
downward biasness in small samples (Gabaix and Ibragimov, 2011).
To sum up, this first picture presents a situation where the European
Union is exactly split into two halves. Small countries (in terms of lands)
as Cyprus, Denmark, Luxembourg, Netherlands and Portugal, or tran-
sition countries as Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia and Hungary are
experimenting strong forces toward agglomeration and present a highly
hierarchical city system. Instead, big (in terms of land size) countries as
Poland, Romania and developed (in economic terms) countries as Bel-
gium, France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom present a
more even distribution of cities where the congestion forces play an im-
portant role.
Finally, considering the EU as a whole (country), the estimated rank-
size coefficient is 1.40 indicating a quite even city distribution. It is in-
teresting to compare this result with the estimated q coefficient of the
aggregation of countries using the Euro. The estimated coefficient is al-
most the same (1.38), although it should be noticed that the estimation of
the upper tail with the method proposed by Clauset et al. (2009) returns
a longer upper tail for EMU, 2660, than EU, 1419.
Until now we have presented just a static draw of the European situa-
tion. We will explore the impact of the underlying economic mechanism
and of the constitution of the EU, the Euro and the Schengen Area on the
agglomeration forces in the sub-section 4.4.3. In the next section, instead,
we address the homogeneity issue.
4.4.2 Is the EU an Integrated Area? The role of hypothet-
ical shocks
In this section we analyze the homogeneity/heterogeneity of city sys-
tems in term of growth within the EU using Gibrat’s law. Gibrat’s law in
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assessing heterogeneity is not conventional, however Black and Hende-
rson (2003), state that if Gibrat’s law holds, then a shock affects in the
same way big vs small entities and, Brakman, Garretsen and Schramm
(2004), state that if Gibrat’s law holds, then a large temporary shock can
have a permanent impact. In other words, this means that hypothetical
shocks can change (permanently) the growth path toward another size
equilibrium.
In general we can interpret Gibrat’s law as follows: “A variate subject
to a process of change is said to obey the law of proportionate effect if the change
in the variate at any step of the process is a random proportion of the previous
value of the variate” (Chesher, 1979, p. 403). Given this definition, Gabaix
(1999) affirms that a growth process that has a common mean and a com-
mon variance follows Gibrat’s law or, in other words, that both the mean
and variance have to be independent from the initial city size.
Moreover, proposition 2 of Gabaix (1999) affirms that if a country is
composed of several regions and Gibrat’s law holds in each of those re-
gions, then in the whole country Zipf’s law is satisfied both at regional
and national level. This means that if the growth processes are (in the up-
per tail) identical within each region, but not necessarily across regions,
then in the whole country the strength of the agglomeration forces in
the system of cities is necessarily the same. This issue has been firstly ad-
dressed empirically by Giesen and Suedekum (2011) for Germany. In this
section, we take the moves from those papers and we provide a country-
wide test of Gibrat’s law from a EU Member States’ perspective.
Operationally, a typical way to assess the validity of Gibrat’s law is
using non-parametric analysis (Ioannides and Overman, 2003; Eeckhout,
2004; Giesen and Suedekum, 2011; Gonzalez-val et al., 2012; Modica et
al., 2013). In doing that, we use the normalized growth rate, that is the
difference between a city’s growth rate and the mean city growth rate, all
divided by the standard deviation of growth.
The strength of non-parametric analysis is that we do not impose
any relationship between the dependent and independent variables and,
moreover, we can see the behavior of mean and variance at any possi-
ble truncation, avoiding in this way the concern about the right selection
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of the truncation point arose by Fazio and Modica (2012). This is also
stressed by the following sentence in Cameron and Trivedi (2005, p. 294),
“[non-parametric analysis] let the data show the shape of the relationship”. In
fact, the standard parametric regression methods provide an aggregate
relationship between growth and size that holds over the entire support
of city sizes. Instead, the non-parametric method allow the growth to
vary with size over the support.
In this analysis, we use the Nadaraya-Watson (NW) method (Nadarya
1964; Watson 1964), where the bandwidths are calculated with an opti-
mal rule of thumb.8 If Gibrat’s law holds, the NW method provides sta-
ble estimated conditional mean and variance across different population
sizes, that on the light of the normalization are respectively 0 and 1. We
also calculate 5% bootstrapped confidence interval based on 500 samples
(see Hardle, 1990). If Gibrat’s law does not hold, instead, the series of
growth rates is stationary and it will converge toward a constant mean.
Therefore, large values (big entities) will be followed at any further peri-
ods by smaller and smaller values, while small values (small entities)
will be followed by larger and larger ones. In this way, the level of the
series at any periods can significantly predict the one of the next period.
The figures below provide the non-parametric estimates of condi-
tional mean and variance for all the Member States.
Figures 7-9 show that, although the EU is still far from being an inte-
grated area, we are able to recognize a homogenous area (in terms of city
growth) where exogenous shocks might affect the city structure in the
same way (Gibrat’s law holds). In details, this area is composed by the
following Member States: Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, Finland,
France, Germany, Ireland, Lithuania, Malta. In all these cases, indeed, the
conditional mean and the conditional variance look independent from
the city size.
In the rest of the countries Gibrat’s law does not hold and in particu-
lar the growth series presents mean reversion and stationarity namely
big cities are expected to grow less than small ones (Black and Hen-
dreson, 2003) and this fact is characterized by a conditional mean growth
8We refer readers to their papers for a more detailed description.
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and variance that are respectively lower than 0 and 1 for larger size of
cities. Those countries are Austria, Czech, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Lux-
embourg, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain and UK, and all
present mean reversion in the growth process. In this situation, then, any
exogenous shock has to be though as temporary and the countries will
converge toward the pre-shock conditions in a certain period of time.
Finally, very few countries show a situation where there exists an “ex-
plosive” growth process, that is a situation in which big cities are ex-
pected to grow more than small ones. In more details those Member
States are Bulgaria, Latvia and Sweden. They present a situation where
people tend to moves from the small city to the big ones and it is shown
by a conditional mean growth and variance that are respectively greater
than 0 and 1 for larger size of cities.9
To sum, the European Union seems to be split in three distinct areas:
an integrated area characterized by the validity of Gibrat’s law where
large temporary shocks might have permanent impacts on the city struc-
ture; another area that is characterized by the presence of mean reversion
and where any exogenous shock is used up in certain amount of time and
a small area where the effects of the shocks is magnified in the big cities.
Given the static and dynamic picture of the European Union, it re-
mains to explore the impact of the underlying economic mechanism and
of the constitution of the EU, the Euro and the Schengen Area on the
agglomeration forces. This is studied in deep in the next sub-section.
4.4.3 The impact of economic/institutional variables on
agglomeration forces
In this sub-section we try to answer to the following question: does the
creation of the European Union with free movement of goods, services
people an capital, change the population distribution across geographic
areas? The rank-size coefficient, indeed, can be seen as a measure of
urbanization: the larger the value of the coefficient, the more even the
population of cities in the urban system.
9Unfortunately we don’t have enough data to explore Gibrat’s law in the Netherlands
and Romania
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There are several potential explanations for variations in its value,
one of these can be found in a model of economic geography a la Krug-
man (1991) and Fujita et al. (1999). These models can be viewed as
models of unevenness in the distribution of economic activity and more-
over, they state that for certain parameter values, economic activity is
agglomerated, while for other parameter values, economic activity is dis-
persed (i.e. a city system will be more agglomerated the greater are scale
economies, the lower are transport costs and the lower the share of in-
ternational trade in the economy). Henderson and Wang (2007), instead,
emphasize on the role of the institutions. The constitution of the EU,
then, might had affected the urban structure of the Member States.
In this section we look for both the impact of institutional and eco-
nomic variables on the level of the hierarchical structure. We also control
for other variables that could influence the size distribution of cities, in-
cluding the size of the country as measured by population, land area or
GDP. Following Soo (2005) our estimated equation is:
qit = β0 + β1CONTROL+ β2ECON + β3POLITIC + β4DUMMY + uit (4.6)
where q is is the rank-size coefficient estimated in the previous step,
CONTROL is the vector of controls for the size of the country, including
the log of per capita GDP in constant US dollars, the log of the total land
of the country, and the log of population. ECON is a group of economic-
geography and connectivity variables: scale economies, transport costs
(the inverse of road density), trade as a percentage of GDP, number of
internet users per 100 people.
Scale economies is the degree of scale economies, and it is constructed
following Soo (2005). They are the share of industrial output in high-
scale industries. Transport cost is measured as the inverse of road den-
sity.
POLITIC is a set of political variables as government expenditure as
a share of GDP in education and foreign direct investment as net inflow
( % of GDP). Finally, DUMMY indicates the variables strictly related to
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the creation of European Union (belonging to EU, adhesion to Schengen
and interaction between the two).
One potential concern, stressed by Soo (2005), is the fact that using
an estimated coefficient from a former stage regression as a dependent
variable in a subsequent stage regression it might lead to inefficient esti-
mates and heteroskedasticity in the second stage because of likely mea-
surement error in the first stage, Lewis and Linzer (2005). We could
use feasible generalized least squares (FGLS) to overcome this problem.
However, Baltagi (1995) and Beck and Katz (1995) show that: i) FGLS
yields consistent estimates of the variances only if T goes to infinity and,
ii) FGLS tends to underestimates standard errors.
In the present chapter, following Soo (2005), we use, first, panel cor-
rected standard errors with OLS, as proposed by Beck and Katz (1995)
because it does not underestimate standard errors and second we run
time fixed effect and random effect estimations. The regressions are those
that are reported below.
Table 14 presents the results using the OLS estimate of the Pareto ex-
ponent as the dependent variable. The number of observations is some-
what less than the full sample because data is not available for all coun-
tries in all years. Column (1) is the panel corrected standard errors with
OLS model without dummy variables. Column (2) includes all the vari-
ables and Column (3) and (4) are, respectively, time fixed effect and ran-
dom effect models. Two factors seem to have a significant impact on the
city hierarchical structures of the countries: the extent of international
trade and the adhesion to the Schengen Area. Moreover, population and
land size respectively positively and negatively influence the city struc-
ture of the Member States.
In more detail international trade enters with a (small) negative im-
pact on the rank-size coefficient, that is something not predicted from
the theory since, following Fujita et al. (1999), a greater extent of inter-
national trade weakens the force for agglomeration and leads to a more
even distribution of economic activity. However this result is in line with
previous findings of Soo (2005) and Alperovich (1993).
Column (4) instead shows that the adhesion to the Schengen Area
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Table 14: Panel estimation of Eq. (6) (dependent variable = OLS coefficient
of q)
Dependent
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variable OLS OLS FE RE
Trade (% of GDP) -.00398** -.00382** -.00228*** -.00173
(.00167) (.00157) (.00134) (.00193)
Scale Economies -.00153 .01735 -.00215 .00237
(.01150) (.01336) (.02064) (.02807)
Expenditure in education (% of GDP) -.00944 -.01972 -.04112 .02409
(.04172) (.04647) (.03071) (.05024)
Transport cost .63581 .71197 -.82159 .789131
(1.6369) (2.0571) (1.9224) (4.06137)
Foreign direct investment -.00071 -.00113 -.00022 -.00015
(.00083) (.00094) (.00068) (.00093)
Internet users .00340 .00268 .00379 -.00005
(.00222) (.00205) (.00385) (.00228)
ln (population) .21367* .19841* .06791 .24237*
(.04678) (.05319) (.04653) (.08341)
ln (land area) -.41339* -.40515* -.13959* -.36686
(.10989) (.10916) (.04491) (.07509)
ln(GDP) .020184 -.00061 .03152 -.00688
(.0546245) (.05700) (.05631) (.09203)
Dummy Euro -.23996 -.13857 .00029
(.16537) (.17491) (.24136)
Dummy Schengen .12124 -.13399 .22971***
(.16815) (.12181) (.13477)
Interaction .18028 .31286 -.13661
(.25287) (.19222) (.26264)
Constant 2.68183** 3.0277* 1.81866*** 1.5775
(1.0473) (1.0788) (.92899) (1.3881)
R-squares 0.5626 0.5724 0.3616 0.5370
N. obs. 66 66 66 66
* Significant at 1% ** significant at 5% *** significant at 10%
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leads to a more even distribution (higher rank-size coefficient). This re-
sult can be interpreted as the results of the increased freedom of mobility
between Member States that leads to the movements from the big cities
(especially in the transition countries) to the small cities.
Comparing our results to previous findings, we find that our results
are broadly in line with those of Rosen and Resnick (1980) as they find
that the rank-size coefficient is positively related to the total population
and negatively related to land area. However, we found lack of signifi-
cance for most of the economic and political variables presented by Soo
(2005).
In conclusion, it seems that the constitution of the European Union
per se does not have any influence on the change of the population distri-
bution across geographic areas. The only variables that have influenced
the city structure of the Member States are those strictly related the in-
creases of the mobility of people, capitals and services (the constitution
of the Schengen area) and a variable closed to the idea of globalization,
that is the share of international trade.
4.5 Conclusion
The aim of our research work was to draw the current city system of
the Member States of the European Union firstly for any single country
and subsequently as a whole state. Given this picture we aim to explore
if and how the creation of European Union affects the structure of the
system of cities of the Member States and primarily if EU city system can
be seen as an integrated area. The main objective was the study of the
agglomeration forces within all the Member States and the EU as a whole
and for this reason we used two very well-known empirical regularities
that address (indirectly) this issue, namely Zipf’s law and Gibrat’s law.
For this purpose we used the rank-size exponent, q, as a proxy for
agglomeration forces in a system of cities (Singer, 1930; Brakman et al.,
2001) since the lower the q-coefficient, the more agglomerated is the city
distribution (Soo, 2005). Gibrat’s law, instead, is used as a tool to test
whether a (hypothetical) shock (will) influence the EU Member States in
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the same way or, on the contrary, if it (will) has heterogeneous effects.
Indeed, if Gibrat’s law holds a large temporary shock might have a per-
manent and similar impact on the growth path of the cities, this means
that a shock can change the growth path toward another size equilib-
rium.
We started our analysis providing an accurate description of agglom-
eration. This has involved a static analysis, supported by Zipf’s law,
accounting for the way the population is gathered over different geo-
graphic locations and, a dynamic analysis, supported by Gibrat’s law,
accounting for the evolution over time of the distribution of the popula-
tion over different locations.
We showed that the hierarchical structures of Member States of EU is
more agglomerated than expected.
Given this picture, the dynamic analysis, supported by Gibrat’s law,
showed that EU city system is still far from being an integrated area and
in particular, we found that the European Union seems to be split in three
distinct areas: an integrated area characterized by the validity of Gibrat’s
law where large temporary shocks might have permanent impacts on the
city structure; another area that is characterized by the presence of mean
reversion and where any exogenous shock is used up in certain amount
of time and a small area where the effects of the shocks is magnified in
the big cities.
Finally, by means of a regression analysis we explored how the cre-
ation of European Union affects the structure of the system of cities and
then the agglomeration forces of the Member States. Our results showed
that only the constitution of the Schengen Area and the share of interna-
tional trade seem to have a weak impact on the hierarchical structures
of Member States presenting respectively a positive impact on the Zipf
coefficient (more even distribution) and a negative impact (more agglom-
erated distribution).
In conclusion Gibrat’s law and Zipf’s law are here used to reflect im-
portant organized structures in the topology of systems of cities. How-
ever this study can be extended in several directions taking into account
for instance the persistent existence of socio-economic disparities between
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Member States (based, for example, on Gini index) or considering the
role of the new communication technologies on the system of cities or
finally considering the transport infrastructure in a integrated system.
Clearly, the dynamics of such processes deserve due attention.
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